As a follow-on to my last post, I note that USGCRP (2017) Chapter 15: Potential Surprises provides the following supporting evidence for their medium confidence assertion that consensus climate models underestimate paleo reconstructions of climate sensitivity:
USGCRP, 2017: Climate Science Special Report: Fourth National Climate Assessment, Volume I [Wuebbles, D.J., D.W. Fahey, K.A. Hibbard, D.J. Dokken, B.C. Stewart, and T.K. Maycock (eds.)]. U.S. Global Change Research Program, Washington, DC, USA, 470 pp.
Title: "Chapter 15: Potential Surprises: Compound Extremes and Tipping Elements"
https://science2017.globalchange.gov/chapter/15/Extract: "While climate models incorporate important climate processes that can be well quantified, they do not include all of the processes that can contribute to feedbacks, compound extreme events, and abrupt and/or irreversible changes. For this reason, future changes outside the range projected by climate models cannot be ruled out (very high confidence). Moreover, the systematic tendency of climate models to underestimate temperature change during warm paleoclimates suggests that climate models are more likely to underestimate than to overestimate the amount of long-term future change (medium confidence).
…
The second half of this key finding is based upon the tendency of global climate models to underestimate, relative to geological reconstructions, the magnitude of both long-term global mean warming and the amplification of warming at high latitudes in past warm climates (e.g., Salzmann et al. 2013; Goldner et al. 2014; Caballeo and Huber 2013; Lunt et al. 2012)."
Note USGCRP (2017) classifies Medium Confidence as: "Suggestive evidence (a few sources, limited consistency, models incomplete, methods emerging, etc.), competing schools of thought"
Furthermore, the guide to USGCRP (2017) classifies these "Potential Surprises" as 'potential low probability/high consequence "surprises" resulting from climate change' and as 'high-risk tails and bounding scenarios'; and acknowledge that 'knowledge gaps' exist that limit their ability to precisely define the probability/risks associated with these "surprises".
https://science2017.globalchange.gov/chapter/front-matter-guide/Extract: "Complementing this use of risk-focused language and presentation around specific scientific findings in the report, Chapter 15: Potential Surprises provides an overview of potential low probability/high consequence “surprises” resulting from climate change. This includes its analyses of thresholds, also called tipping points, in the climate system and the compounding effects of multiple, interacting climate change impacts whose consequences may be much greater than the sum of the individual impacts. Chapter 15 also highlights critical knowledge gaps that determine the degree to which such high-risk tails and bounding scenarios can be precisely defined, including missing processes and feedbacks."
This USGCRP (2017) characterization of "Potential Surprises", reinforces my belief that consensus climate scientists are acting as co-dependents who cleverly facilitate the fossil fuel addiction of the decision makers that have put us all at risk of climate catastrophe this century, as illustrated by the cascading tipping points cited by the DominoES project.
I wish that I had the time and energy to repeat the thousands of posts that I have made that indicate that such "Potential Surprises" this century are much more likely than low probability high-risk tail events; which ignores such consideration as: that CO2e is currently over 530ppm, that recent masking mechanisms and lag time have hidden some of the apparent risk, that none of the CMIP5 modeling include ice-climate feedback mechanism, etc. Nevertheless, I repost the four attached images, with:
The first image by Friedrich et al. (2016), illustrating that USGRP (2017) ignored numerous recent studies that used dynamical analysis of paleo data to show that ECS has been/is higher than consensus science acknowledge.
The second image by Armour (2016), illustrating that USGRP (2017) ignored consideration of slow response mechanisms that PH17 show have been slowly/progressively activated since 1750 and are now in effect. When considering these slow response feedbacks the most frequent (mode) value for ECS is about 4C, but due to the right-skew of the PDF the mean value is close to 5C.
The middle panel of the third image from Andrew's 2015 Ringberg presentation shows that the slow response mechanism identified by PH17 is characterized by a warm Tropical Pacific and has an ECS value of about 5C. Furthermore, I note that the ice-climate feedback mechanism (including freshwater hosing events from the AIS (particularly the WAIS), the GIS, and from a reversal of the Beaufort Gyre) were ignored by consensus models and all contribute to rapid warming of the tropical oceans and particularly the Tropical Pacific.
While all consensus models cited by USGRP (2017) ignored radiative forcing input from permafrost regions, the fourth image illustrates just one such ignored positive feedback mechanism that following RCP 8.5 until about 2050-2060 will result in major pulse emissions of both carbon dioxide and methane from thermokarst lakes in the Arctic permafrost.
There are many other 'dominoes' that I could cite for a scenario of a potential cascade of tipping points leading to abrupt climate change this century; however, as the US DOE is spending hundreds of millions of dollars on the state-of-the-art E3SM climate model (to be completed by 2027).