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Messages - Hefaistos

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I apologize in advance for rehashing this. It will be my last post on the topic in this thread. I will crosspost this to the global surface temperature thread. I would ask that you respond to me there

I trust that the graph below will settle our debate, and we can stop with the gaslighting?

The graph shows 6 temperature data sets: Berkeley Earth’s, NASA’s GISTEMP, NOAA’s GlobalTemp, the UK’s HadCRUT, Cowtan & Way, and ECMWF's.

Note that the anomaly on the graph is compared to the 1981-2010 baseline.

Note that the lowest temperature anomaly for 2019 is ~0.44C in the HadCRUT dataset (dark blue line).

Note that as pasted below (taken from the CopernicusEU website where the ECMWF data is posted) 0.63°C (±0.06ºC) should be added to this value to relate it to the pre-industrial level defined in the IPCC Special Report on “Global Warming of 1.5°C”.

Using this method for the HadCRUT dataset we get 0.44 + 0.63 = 1.07 = ~1.1C above the preindustrial baseline.

Note that the highest temperature anomaly for 2019 is from the ECMWF data set, which gives a corrected value of 1.22 or ~1.2C above the pre-industrial baseline (as posted below from their website).

So all datasets place 2019 above 1C of warming over preindustrial, with the median being ~1.15C above preindustrial, though the mean would be higher since HadCRUT is the most anomalous from the other datasets.

"Averaging over twelve-month periods smooths out the shorter-term variations. Globally, the calendar year 2019 was 0.59°C warmer than the 1981-2010 average. The warmest twelve-month period was from October 2015 to September 2016, with a temperature 0.66°C above average. 2016 is the warmest calendar year on record, with a global temperature 0.63°C above that for 1981-2010. 2019 has become the second warmest calendar year in this data record. The third warmest calendar year, 2017, had a temperature 0.54°C above average.

0.63°C (±0.06ºC) should be added to these values to relate recent global temperatures to the pre-industrial level defined in the IPCC Special Report on “Global Warming of 1.5°C”. Using the central estimate and rounding to one decimal place, the average temperature for 2019 is 1.2°C above the level."

You managed to find one dataset that disagrees with the IPCC.  And you accuse me of gaslighting?

A.1. Human activities are estimated to have caused approximately 1.0°C of global warming above pre-industrial levels, with a likely range of 0.8°C to 1.2°C. Global warming is likely to reach 1.5°C between 2030 and 2052 if it continues to increase at the current rate. (high confidence) (Figure SPM.1) {1.2}

A.1.1. Reflecting the long-term warming trend since pre-industrial times, observed global mean surface temperature (GMST) for the decade 2006–2015 was 0.87°C (likely between 0.75°C and 0.99°C) higher than the average over the 1850–1900 period (very high confidence). Estimated anthropogenic global warming matches the level of observed warming to within ±20% (likely range). Estimated anthropogenic global warming is currently increasing at 0.2°C (likely between 0.1°C and 0.3°C) per decade due to past and ongoing emissions (high confidence). {1.2.1, Table 1.1, 1.2.4}

Also, Copernicus compares it's reanalysis temperatures to the same pre-industrial study I linked to upthread.

Change over the industrial era

The Paris Agreement established the aim of "holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C", but did not specify precisely what was meant by "pre-industrial levels". This has now been assessed in a scientific paper independent of C3S that proposes a baseline of 1720-1800 for estimating subsequent change over the industrial era. The paper also estimates that the atmosphere from 1986-2005 was on average between 0.55 and 0.80°C warmer than it was over the baseline period.

As I posted upthread, NASA GISS has a running 5 year average that puts current global temperatures at about 0.9C above pre-industrial.  The IPCC report from 2018 states that we're 1C above average.

Are NASA and GISS gaslighting?  Or are you cherry-picking the one dataset that supports your conclusions and ignoring all other results?

For those who think that I overemphasize the potential economic impacts of following SSP5-8.5 for a few more decades (say until 2050), the linked reference finds that using conventional logic: "Our results show that the largest climate change damages occur under the SSP3-7.0 scenario (involving regional rivalry and high anthropogenic emissions), followed by the SSP3-LowNTCF scenario (which considers significantly reduced NTCF emissions), and that climate change damage costs are expected to grow much faster than global GDP (reaching ~47% of global GDP in 2100)."

YatingChen et al. (2020), "Quantifying economic impacts of climate change under nine future emission scenarios within CMIP6", Science of The Total Environment, Volume 703, 134950,


The concept of “environmental determinism” suggests that climate conditions played a substantial role in shaping modern society. To minimize the social costs of future climate change and to promote economic development through identification of cost-effective adaptation strategies and mitigation policies, quantitative assessments are needed for obtaining a better understanding of the causal impacts of climate change on human society. In this work, we estimate the economic impacts of climate change during the 21st century under nine CMIP6 scenarios, using the PAGE-ICE integrated assessment model driven by the latest anthropogenic emission and socio-economic projections. Our results show that the largest climate change damages occur under the SSP3-7.0 scenario (involving regional rivalry and high anthropogenic emissions), followed by the SSP3-LowNTCF scenario (which considers significantly reduced NTCF emissions), and that climate change damage costs are expected to grow much faster than global GDP (reaching ~47% of global GDP in 2100). Gaps in adaptation resulting from regional inequalities would lead to higher climate change damages in poorer and warmer regions such as Africa and the Middle East. The outcomes obtained under the SSP1-1.9 and SSP1-2.6 scenarios, in which the warming limit targets of 1.5 °C and 2 °C set forth in the Paris Agreement are considered, respectively, reveal that aggressive mitigation strategies pass a cost-benefit analysis and could significantly reduce the economic impacts of climate change.

I think everyone on this forum would agree that it's a good thing we're no longer on an SSP 8.5 or 7.0 trajectory anymore.

Policy and solutions / Re: Renewable Energy
« on: January 13, 2020, 10:28:16 PM »
US Energy Consumption Trends - Million Tons of Oil Equivalent (Mtoe)

Sources; BP, IRENA and SEIA.

Primary Energy Consumption (2018) 2,301
 - Oil 920; NG 703; Coal 317; Nuclear 192; Hydro 65; Other Renewables 104

10 years growth rate: -0.4%/2018 growth rate: 3.5%
 - Oil -0.6%/2%; NG 1.7%/10.5%; Coal -4.9%/-4.3%; Nuclear 0%/0.3%; Hydro 2%/-2.7%; Other Renewables 14%/10%.

In 2019, US coal consumption was down 18% from 2018 (your numbers are from 2018).  Wind and solar are now cheaper than coal.  We're seeing many announcements of utilities closing coal power plants decades earlier than planned and replacing them with renewables.

Wind or solar plus battery storage is now cheaper than natural gas peaker plants (and more responsive, providing better grid reliability and flexibility).  We've seen announcements of utilities cancelling planned natural gas peaker plants and replacing them with wind or solar plus battery storage.

In a few years, wind and solar will be cheaper than baseline natural gas plants.  Soon utilities will start to cancel planned natural gas plants as they realize that the natural gas power plants wont operate long enough to pay off their capital costs.   Utilities will also retire older natural gas power plants when major maintenance is due because it will be cheaper to replace them with renewables.

And since your post is about total energy consumption, keep in mind that battery electric vehicles (BEVs) are projected to reach cost parity with gas burning cars in the next few years (probably by 2022).  Automakers are planning to introduce dozens of new BEV models in the next two years.  So transportation will increasingly be decarbonized in the 2020s.

The majority of low TCR value returns in the CMIP6 runs also have very low ECS while a few of the higher ECS ones have low TCRs as well.

Not true.  It helps to read the entire paper, not just the abstract.

2  Method

We use the CMIP6 multimodel ensemble to find an emergent relationship between historical warming and TCR. We use all currently available models that have control (piControl), historical, Shared Socioeconomic Pathway 3-7.0 (ssp370) and one percent  CO2 increase  per  year  (1pctCO2)  experiments.  From  the  1pctCO2  experiment  TCR  is  determined  as  the  average temperature difference from the corresponding piControl run between 60 to 80 years after the start of the simulation. Values of TCR are given in table 1.

Table 1. List of CMIP6 models used in this study and their equilibrium climate sensitivity (ECS) and transient climate response (TCR). Mean values are reported for models with multiple realisations. ECS and the climate feedback parameter λ are computed using the Gregory method (Gregory, 2004). Starred models had full model output available and are the ones included in the emergent constraint. Values for CMIP5 are from (Flato et al., 2013), and model selection the same as in (Nijsse et al., 2019).

The table is on page 4 of the linked paper (due to formatting issues I can't reproduce it in this post).  The mean ECS for CMIP6 models used in the study is 4.16 and ranges from 2.70 to 5.66.  The mean TCR is 2.06 and ranges from 1.46 to 2.73.

One of the models used, the NCAR CESM2, had an ECS of 5.17 and a TCR of 2.08.  Another, the MOHC UKESM1-0-LL had an ECS of 5.41 and a TCR of 2.72.

After applying emergent constraints, the paper concludes that the mean TCR of the CMIP models, including those with high TCRs and ECS, was 1.82, almost unchanged from the CMIP5 results.  And this is consistent with several other recent studies using emergent constraints.

Instead, the CMIP6 models help to constrain the likely TCR range, without significantly changing the central estimate. Our best estimate for TCR from the CMIP6 models is 1.82K, which remains close to the centre of the likely range (1-2.5K) given in the IPCC AR5 (IPCC, 2013). The emergent constraint on TCR from the CMIP6 models is however strong enough to indicate a much tighter likely range of TCR (1.5-2.2K).

We find a consistent emergent constraint from the CMIP5 models against observed global warming from 1970 to 2018 (1.31-2.22 K). Furthermore, both of these likely ranges overlap strongly with the emergent constraint on TCR derived by (Jiménez-de-la Cuesta and Mauritsen, 2019) using a similar method, but only considering global warming from 1970 to 2005 (1.17-2.16 K). In terms of the classification proposed by Hall et al. (2019), we therefore now have a confirmed emergent constraint on TCR, implying an approximate likely range of 1.5 to 2.2K.

A couple of charts from that second linked reference above really make clear how extreme the RCP 8.5 (updated to SSP5-8.5 for AR6) scenario is compared to current energy use trends:

Annual CO2 emissions from fossil fuel and industry in CPS and STPS IEA scenarios compared to the range of baseline scenarios examined in the SSP Database, as well as a subset of the baseline and mitigation scenarios chosen for use in the upcoming IPCC AR6 report.

Annual CO2 emissions from fossil fuel and industry in CPS and STPS IEA scenarios compared to the range of baseline scenarios examined in the SSP Database. Scenarios are extended from 2040 through 2100 by assuming constant emissions after 2040, or by assuming that the rate of emissions growth from 2030 to 2040 continues for the remainder of the century.

AbruptSLR does a great job of highlighting the potential impacts if we stay on what was termed "business as usual" energy scenarios from 10 years ago that drove the IPCC AR5 RCP 8.5 emissions pathway.  He ignores the fact that renewable energy is now cheaper than coal which makes RCP 8.5 to be a more extreme scenario than is possible.  Here are two articles on that subject.

We’re Getting a Clearer Picture of the Climate Future — and It’s Not as Bad as It Once Looked
By David Wallace-Wells

For once, the climate news might be better than you thought. It’s certainly better than I’ve thought.

You may not have noticed it, amid the flood of bad news about the “Emissions Gap” and the collapse of the COP25 climate conference in Madrid, but over the last few weeks a new narrative about the climate future has emerged, on balance encouraging, at least to an alarmist like me. It is this: As best as we can understand and project the medium- and long-term trajectories of energy use and emissions, the window of possible climate futures is probably narrowing, with both the most optimistic scenarios and the most pessimistic ones seeming, now, less likely.

The assumptions about those factors represent a variety of different no-policy futures, each reflecting different assumptions about the way the world’s energy systems and economies will evolve over the next decades. And the assumptions about those factors which are baked into RCP8.5 seem, by the year, more and more implausible — chiefly that global coal use, which is growing slowly, would dramatically increase over the rest of the century. Given that China is still opening new coal plants, and much of the developing world has yet to reach levels of prosperity where energy use explodes, some growth in coal is probably inevitable, perhaps even dramatic growth. But by 2100, RCP8.5 would require 6.5 times as much global coal use as we have today. That may be possible, given how much we don’t know about the path developing nations in south and southeast Asia and sub-Saharan Africa will take. But given recent drops in renewable pricing, and the positive signs for coal decline in the developed world, as a prediction about energy use RCP8.5 is probably closer to a “worst case,” outlier scenario than anything it would be fair to call “business as usual.”

A 3C World Is Now “Business as Usual”
Dec 18, 2019

The world is on a path to warm around 3C above pre-industrial levels by 2100 under policies and commitments currently in place. This is a far cry from the 1.5C and 2C targets enshrined in the Paris agreements, but is also well short of the 4C to 5C warming in many “business as usual” baseline scenarios that continue to be widely used.

Two recently released reports — the International Energy Agency (IEA) 2019 World Energy Outlook (WEO) and the UN Environment Program (UNEP) 2019 Emissions Gap Report — both reflect current trends in clean energy technology costs and deployment and make the case that global emissions will be relatively flat over the next few decades. These estimates are on the low end of those in the latest set of fully integrated baseline scenarios featured in the energy modeling literature that intend to depict a world without climate policy — the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs), developed for the upcoming 2021 IPCC 6th Assessment Report (AR6).

But what about by the end of the century? In this analysis, we take the 2040 IEA emissions projections and examine their implications for end-of-century warming. We find that IEA numbers imply that the most likely outcome of current policies is between 2.9-3.4C warming — which is reduced to around 2.7-3C warming if countries meet their current Paris Agreement commitments.

2040 fossil fuel and industry emissions for the three IEA scenarios compared to the range of baseline scenarios examined in the AR5 and the SSP Database. The SSP baseline and mitigation scenarios used by CMIP6 climate models in the upcoming IPCC AR6 are also shown for reference. IEA projections do not include emissions from industry, so FF&I values are calculated by adding a constant 2.4 GtCO2 reflecting 2018 industry emissions.

IEA CPS emissions in 2040 are in-between the SSP4-6.0 and SSP2-4.5 scenarios, and are in the bottom 15% of all the baseline scenarios in the SSP database. The SPS scenario is a bit below SSP2-4.5, and lower than any baseline scenarios — though this is not necessarily unexpected, as baseline scenarios exclude current commitments that have not yet been translated into policy.

Policy and solutions / Re: Oil and Gas Issues
« on: December 21, 2019, 05:39:13 PM »
Doesn't it feel so good to us Europeans to know the USA is looking after us so bigly.

Permafrost / Re: Permafrost general science thread
« on: December 19, 2019, 07:51:27 PM »
While the news from the Arctic seems dire, keep in mind that in both the cases of the Alaskan tundra carbon emissions highlighted in the 2019 Arctic Report Card and the attention given to thermokarst emissions are based on a few measurements over a short period of time in smaller areas extrapolated to the entire globe. 

Here are the details from the Arctic Report Card.

Another approach to this same question is to measure changes in atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations and to separate out contributions from different sources. Given the extent of fossil fuel carbon emissions, it remains a challenge to quantify and separate the effect of ecosystem carbon exchange, but regional atmospheric measurement campaigns can help to focus in on local influences (Parazoo et al. 2016). Recent measurements of atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations over Alaska by NASA aircraft have been used to the estimate the net regional impact on the atmosphere by those Arctic and boreal ecosystems for 2012 to 2014 (Commane et al. 2017). This recent NASA campaign was able to provide important insight into the aggregate influence of the carbon exchange for the Alaska permafrost region, across tundra, boreal forests, and wetland/lake/freshwater ecosystems as a whole. During this three-year time period, the tundra region of Alaska was found to be a consistent net CO2 source to the atmosphere, whereas the boreal forest region was either neutral or a net CO2 sink. The boreal forest region exhibited larger interannual variability due both to changes in the balance of photosynthesis and respiration and to the amount of combustion emissions by wildfire.

The Alaska study region as a whole was estimated to be a net carbon source of 0.025 ± 0.014 Pg C per year averaged over the land area of both tundra and boreal forest regions for the three-year study period. If this Alaskan region (1.6 × 106 km2) was representative of the entire northern circumpolar permafrost region soil area (17.8 × 106 km2), this amount would be equivalent to a circumpolar net source of 0.3 Pg C per year. Historically (over hundreds to thousands of years), the Arctic region was accumulating carbon in soils and vegetation and thus was acting as a net sink of atmospheric CO2. Assuming this three-year snapshot provided by NASA aircraft monitoring is indicative of the Arctic's current physical and biological environment, a significant and major threshold has been crossed in the high latitude region whereas the aggregate effect of terrestrial ecosystems is now contributing to, rather than slowing, climate change.

Alaska has a large and active oil and gas industry, which most of the Arctic doesn't.  The oil and gas industry is notorious for having a lot of methane leaks and flaring (which enhances both CH4 and CO2 concentrations in the oil fields).

While the report card does acknowledge that global warming may increase the growing season and thus increase the sinks, the calculations that lead to the headline grabbing results didn't include the effects of the increased growing season.

Another impact of global warming is that the area of tundra (the portion of the Arctic that is increasing emissions) is shrinking and the area of the boreal forest is increasing.  The Report Card states that the boreal forests are either neutral or sinks.

Here's a 2016 paper on the change in the Arctic from tundra to forests.

Enhanced seasonal CO2 exchange caused by amplified plant productivity in northern ecosystems
Matthias Forkel,1*†Nuno Carvalhais,1,2*Christian Rödenbeck,1Ralph Keeling,3Martin Heimann,1,4Kirsten Thonicke,5Sönke Zaehle,1Markus Reichstein1,6

Atmospheric monitoring of high northern latitudes (above 40°N) has shown an enhanced seasonal cycle of carbon dioxide (CO2) since the 1960s, but the underlying mechanisms are not yet fully understood. The much stronger increase in high latitudes relative to low ones suggests that northern ecosystems are experiencing large changes in vegetation and carbon cycle dynamics. We found that the latitudinal gradient of the increasing CO2 amplitude is mainly driven by positive trends in photosynthetic carbon uptake caused by recent climate change and mediated by changing vegetation cover in northern ecosystems. Our results underscore the importance of climate–vegetation–carbon cycle feedbacks at high latitudes; moreover, they indicate that in recent decades, photosynthetic carbon uptake has reacted much more strongly to warming than have carbon release processes.

A variety of factors may contribute to the CO2amplitude trend. Arctic and boreal regions have experienced strong warming in recent decades(6), and a“greening” trend has been detected from satellites, indicating enhanced plant growth(7,8) (Fig. 1, A and B). These satellite observations are confirmed by ground observations showing increases in shrub coverage in the tundra (9),tree growth along the tundra–boreal forest transition zone (10), and deciduous tree cover from recovery after severe boreal forest fires (11). Additionally, various estimates show positive trends in both annual amplitudes and annual totals of GPP (12,13) and in net biome productivity (NBP)(14)in northern ecosystems (Fig.1,CandD).The intensification of agriculture in the midlatitudes also likely contributes to the CO2 amplitude trends (15,16). These multiple observational signals point to amplified plant productivity as a likely cause of the increase in CO2 amplitude(1,3,7,17). Nonetheless, a quantitative explanation of the amplitude trends is still lacking. Current Earth system models consistently under-estimate the CO2 amplitude trend (4) and its gradient with latitude, which suggests that these models are missing or underrepresenting key processes (18).


Policy and solutions / Re: Renewable Energy
« on: December 19, 2019, 06:42:28 PM »
Here's an article explaining the hedging finance mechanism.

Texas moves closer to merchant solar

Intersect Power has gone live with news the company has 1.7 GWdc ready for construction in Texas and California, including a project which holds a hedge and no power purchase agreement.
September 25, 2019

Solar developer Intersect Power says it has reached late-stage development for five utility scale solar projects in Texas and California with a combined generation capacity of 1.7 GWdc. All the projects are “shovel ready” and construction should begin by October next year, said Intersect.

That means contracts have been signed – and indeed they have, with customers including utilities and other wholesale energy buyers under 10 to 15-year power purchase agreements (PPAs). One of the projects, however, holds a contract for renewable energy certificates and a hedge with a bank for the power sold, instead of a PPA. A hedge contract typically stipulates the guarantor will make up the difference if the energy sold dips below a certain level and will bank the profits if electricity is sold above a specified rate.

That particular Intersect facility is at least the third project with a hedge instead of a PPA pv magazine has seen in Texas. Given shorter PPAs mean a longer “merchant tail”, such arrangements support a move to merchant power. Duke Energy Renewables acquired the 200 MW Holstein project which holds a 12-year hedge agreement with a subsidiary of Goldman Sachs and the Misae 1 solar project in Childress County, Texas, also holds a hedge and no PPA.

Policy and solutions / Re: Renewable Energy
« on: December 19, 2019, 06:21:02 PM »
According to the SEIA, Texas has the 4th most installed solar power in the US, with 3,400 MW.

That's projected to grow to 13,500 MW in the next five years.

Apparently the market conditions have improved enough that larger solar projects are combining PPAs with "hedged" financing to get both the advantages of a set return on a portion of the project while being open to the possibility of larger returns in the spot market.

Another hedged solar project moves forward in Texas

Cubico has closed on financing for the 162 MW Wagyu project on Texas’ Gulf Coast, which holds both a hedge and a PPA, the latest such project to move forward.
October 17, 2019

In Texas’ red-hot solar market, you no longer need a power purchase agreement (PPA) to get financing for your project. In the Lone Star State a new business model of building solar plants to sell power on the wholesale market, with this sale underwritten by hedges, is emerging. What’s more important is that these projects are getting the cash needed to go forward.

But as is often the case with business model developments, the new model of hedges is far from replacing the PPA. As evidence of this, yesterday Cubico Sustainable Investments announced that it has reached financial close on the 162 MW Wagyu solar project in Brazoria County on Texas’ Gulf Coast, which holds both a hedge and a PPA.

And once financing is closed, these projects can be built quickly.

And Cubico is wasting no time in getting the project built; engineering, procurement and construction contractor Renewable Energy Systems has already started building Wagyu, and the project is expected to become fully operational in the third quarter of 2020.

Wagyu is the fourth project to reach financial close in a 580 MW portfolio of solar projects that Cubico bought from Cypress Creek Renewables in January, with the other three located in the Carolinas. Cypress Creek is staying on to provide operations & maintenance services to Wagyu, and also built the 106 MWdc Palmetto Plains solar project. Palmetto Plains is one of the three it sold to Cubico and the largest single-site solar plant to go online in South Carolina to date.

Policy and solutions / Re: Oil and Gas Issues
« on: December 16, 2019, 06:35:16 PM »
I read that article and didn't come to the same conclusion.

Whilst there is a bit of the Red Queen involved, the article skips over a simple reality.

Where do the older wells come from that provide the base profits? They are the young wells which are still operating.

This is more of an investor issue than a reserves issue.  Each new well is a fund of money to drill new wells as it will never be as productive as in the first year.

However once the first year is over the production does not vanish, it continues at a lower level.

So if you use the profits from the first year to fund the drilling of new wells, then pay the investors from the 1yr+ Wells, you have a sustainable model.

Even more, the supply continues to grow as the older wells do not stop producing. So, in reality, the supply continues to grow. Granted it is always on a bubble of first year drilling, but it is not fizzing out and leaving nothing behind it.

The reality is in the numbers.  Over around a decade production has grown from 800,000 barrels pd to 3.5m.  If this story of the Red Queen were totally fixed, that would have been impossible. It is more a case of supply growth requires continual investment to keep the bubble going. This continual investment is not something investors like.  They want to buy in and milk the profits once supply starts. Should have picked a different market.

I would expect this to level out somewhere around a few hundred thousand wells. Which means we have a few more decades to go with fracking.



The frackers haven't made profits, they've been losing money.

They kept telling investors that profits were just around the corner, but in the meantime, they keep increasing production hoping to capture market share, which just increased supplies to the point of depressing the price.  Thus, they ensured more losses.

Investors are done with fracking.  More and more frackers are going bankrupt.  They keep pumping oil out of existing wells to defray some fixed costs, but they don't have the money to keep drilling new wells.  The most hopeful news articles from the oil patch describe it as a "slowdown", but the reality is that frackers can't hope to compete with the easy oil from the middle east and Russia that can be produced at much lower cost.

Profit and Debt Pressures Spark Slowdown in Shale
By Tom Ozimek
December 15, 2019

Fracking insiders said that the dynamic growth of shale in recent years is suffering a slowdown as industry investors demand higher returns and lower debt.

Shale producers such as Pioneer, Range Resources, EQT Corp, and Whiting Petroleum have reduced production targets and cut staff, aiming to meet investors’ bottom-line demands for more profit and less leverage.

Producers have reduced the number of oil rigs operating for a record 12th month in a row, sidelining a quarter of the country’s drilling rigs in the past year, according to service firm Baker Hughes.

Lack of credit Is latest blow to the struggling shale industry
November 22 2019

Banks have begun trimming back the credit lines of America’s shale producers, further undercutting a beleaguered industry that’s been struggling to rebuild investor confidence.

Laredo Petroleum Inc. and Oasis Petroleum Inc. are among at least six producers whose ability to secure short-term loans against their oil and natural gas reserves have dropped by 10% or more, according to data in earnings statements and filings. The declines offer the first hint of results from a semi-annual bank review of the industry’s borrowing capacity that generally runs through December.

For the first time since 2016, an industry survey done prior to the review found most respondents expected to see declines. The noose is tightening at a time when producers have seen their market values plunge 21% this year. Meanwhile, at least 15 producers have already filed for bankruptcy during the year.

n some cases, producers are struggling under debt loads accumulated in earlier, more heady times. But other issues are at play as well: Some have drilled their best locations and are now turning to lower-quality sites. And some have been drilling wells too close together, resulting in a loss of overall performance.

At the same time, energy is the only sector yielding negative returns in the high-yield debt market, falling over 2% compared to a nearly 12% gain for its index.

In some cases, a borrowing-base cut can send a company spinning into bankruptcy. If a driller has already borrowed heavily on its credit line, and the new limit is lower than the outstanding balance, the company is overdrawn and has to repay the excess to the lender.

The linked reference confirms that AR5 significantly underestimated natural emissions of methane from wetlands worldwide, and recommends that policy makers shoulder the responsibility of taking corrective actions associated with AR5s shortcomings on this matter:

The linked reference indicates that the IPCC underestimated methane emissions from livestock:

Given that we can measure the concentration of methane in the atmosphere and thus calculate the total net emissions (all sources minus all sinks), if two sources were underestimated that implies that another source (or multiple sources) were overestimated or that the sinks were underestimated.

Did either reference provide information about what other sources were overestimated or if the sinks were underestimated?

Here a pre-print paper providing a literature review of what "consensus scientists" think the global methane budget has been from 2000 to 2017.  It is probably a good preview of what will show up in IPCC AR6.

The Global Methane Budget 2000-2017


Understanding and quantifying the global methane (CH4) budget is important for assessing realistic pathways to mitigate climate change. Atmospheric emissions and concentrations of CH4 are continuing to increase, making CH4 the second most important human-influenced greenhouse gas in terms of climate forcing, after carbon dioxide (CO2). Assessing the relative importance of CH4 in comparison to CO2 is complicated by its shorter atmospheric lifetime, stronger warming potential, and atmospheric growth rate variations over the past decade, the causes of which are still debated. Two major difficulties in reducing uncertainties arise from the variety of geographically overlapping CH4 sources and from the destruction of CH4 by short-lived hydroxyl radicals (OH). To address these difficulties, we have established a consortium of multi-disciplinary scientists under the umbrella of the Global Carbon Project to synthesize and stimulate new research aimed at improving and regularly updating the global methane budget. Following Saunois et al. (2016), we present here the second version of the living review paper dedicated to the decadal methane budget, integrating results of top-down studies (atmospheric observations within an atmospheric inverse-modelling framework) and bottom-up estimates (including process-based models for estimating land surface emissions and atmospheric chemistry, inventories of anthropogenic emissions, and data-driven extrapolations). 

For the 2008-2017 decade, global methane emissions are estimated by atmospheric inversions (top-down approach) to be 572 Tg CH4 yr-1 (range 538-593, corresponding to the minimum and maximum estimates of the ensemble), of which 357 Tg CH4 yr-1 or ~60% are attributed to anthropogenic sources (range 50-65%). This total emission is 27 Tg CH4 yr-1 larger than the value estimated for the period 2000-2009 and 24 Tg CH4 yr-1 larger than the one reported in the previous budget for the period 2003-2012 (Saunois et al. 2016). Since 2012, global CH4 emissions have been tracking the carbon intensive scenarios developed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Gidden et al., 2019). Bottom-up methods suggest larger global emissions (737 Tg CH4 yr-1, range 583-880) than top-down inversion methods, mostly because of larger estimated natural emissions from sources such as natural wetlands, other inland water systems, and geological sources. However the strength of the atmospheric constraints on the top-down budget, suggest that these bottom-up emissions are overestimated. The latitudinal distribution of atmospheric-based emissions indicates a predominance of tropical emissions (~65% of the global budget, <30°N) compared to mid (~30%, 30°N-60°N) and high northern latitudes (~4%, 60°N-90°N). Our analyses suggest that uncertainties associated with estimates of anthropogenic emissions are smaller than those of natural sources, with top-down inversions yielding larger uncertainties than bottom-up inventories and models. The most important source of uncertainty in the methane budget is attributable to natural emissions, especially those from wetlands and other inland waters. Some global source estimates are smaller compared to the previously published budgets (Saunois et al. 2016; Kirschke et al. 2013), particularly for vegetated wetland emissions that are lower by about 35 Tg CH4 yr-1 due to efforts to partition vegetated wetlands and inland waters. Emissions from geological sources are also found to be smaller by 7 Tg CH4 yr-1, and wild animals by 8 Tg CH4 yr-1. However the overall discrepancy between bottom-up and top-down estimates has been reduced by only 5% compared to Saunois et al. (2016), due to a higher estimate of freshwater emissions resulting from recent research and the integration of emissions from estuaries. Priorities for improving the methane budget include: i) a global, high-resolution map of water-saturated soils and inundated areas emitting methane based on a robust classification of different types of emitting habitats; ii) further development of process-based models for inland-water emissions; iii) intensification of methane observations at local scales (e.g., FLUXNET-CH4 measurements and urban monitoring to constrain bottom-up land surface models, and at regional scales (surface networks and satellites) to constrain atmospheric inversions; iv) improvements of transport models and the representation of photochemical sinks in top-down inversions, and v) development of a 3D variational inversion system using isotopic and/or co-emitted species such as ethane. 

The data presented here can be downloaded from ICOS (; Saunois et al., 2019) and the Global Carbon Project. 

Science / Re: 2019 Mauna Loa CO2 levels
« on: November 28, 2019, 04:19:20 PM »
I am reminded (from many years ago) of a politician in the UK saying "the rate of acceleration of the increase in unemployment has declined" - from which he justified seeing "the green shoots of growth".

We do not know
-  when / if the increase in renewable energy will be greater than the increase in energy demand,
-  if the decline in coal will be matched by increases in Natural Gas consumption,
-  how much CH4 fugitive emissions from Natural Gas production will increase,
-  the extent to which the carbon sinks will continue to decay,

We do not know many things, but we do know
- CO2 ppm will increase for at minimum for a few years more,
- if Governments and the industries that own them don't take action p.d.q. CO2 ppm will increase indefinitely,
- The carbon sinks will become less effective given current policies and trends,
- without major action and change it is likely increases in CO2 ppm will accelerate.

ASLR makes it explicit that he is presenting the right tailed risks, not settled science. While it is difficult to accept so much scientific uncertainty (scientific reticence), the message that ASLR conveys in his posts is one of prudence.

I can think of no better demonstration for why extreme right tailed risks must prompt precautionary action even in the face of great uncertainty than the attached image. It shows the shifting attitude within successive IPCC reports to the likelihood of the temperature at which the onset of climate tipping points begins.

Taken from a comment in Nature from today (Nov. 27), by Lenton et. al

Climate tipping points — too risky to bet against

ASLR does a very good job in pointing out the possible consequences of unchecked fossil fuel emissions.  Unfortunately, he also writes disparagingly of "consensus" scientists and conveys a situation that seems much more dire than it is.  Yes, we need to get off of fossil fuels as soon as possible.  However, he often ignores that we're making great progress in doing so. 

He ignores the fact that most of the highly speculative and sensationalist disaster scenarios he writes about are based on the RCP 8.5 emissions scenario which assumes that renewables will be more expensive than fossil fuels through the 21st century when if fact, renewables are now cheaper than coal.

In fact, 2018 may have been the peak of global coal consumption.

Coal-Fired Power Is Declining Thanks to a Slowdown in India and China
2019 could end with a deceleration in overall carbon emissions.
By C.K. Hickey
November 26, 2019, 4:36 PM

After more than a century as the world’s dominant source of electricity, coal may finally be losing its importance. Coal-fired power production is projected to fall 3 percent this year—the largest annual decline on record. According to a new report from three think tanks and published by Carbon Brief, this reduction represents an amount of electricity greater than that generated by coal from Germany, Spain, and the U.K. combined.

As coal’s contribution to electricity usage falls, electricity generated by non-fossil sources is on the rise across the globe. As seen in the chart below, wind power saw the largest growth among energy sources over the last year.

Coal plants still fuel 38 percent of the world’s electricity, however, and so curtailing the carbon emissions from its production remains essential for limiting a rise in global temperatures. The sharp drop projected in coal-fired electricity suggests 2019 could end with a slowdown in overall carbon emissions, according to the report.

AbruptSLR likes to post about MICI, a highly speculative hyptothesis that the authors have backed away from recently.  He likes to post about the CMIP 6 models that have higher ECS, ignoring the CMIP 6 models that have ECS in line with consensus science (that would be half of them). 

But again, the most egregious error he makes (and many of the catastrophists on this site make) is that since current emissions are close to RCP 8.5 emissions, that the emissions for the rest of the century will continue on the RCP 8.5 path.  Since RCP 8.5 assumes an acceleration of the use of coal and that renewables will be more expensive than coal, the RCP 8.5 emissions scenario just isn't possible.

Here's a graphical representation of the RCP scenarios:

The big black area in the middle of that graph is coal use.   You can see that in 2100 it's responsible for more than half of the emissions in the RCP 8.5 scenario.  It's likely to be zero decades before then.

Natural gas is already in dire straits.  Much of the natural gas infrastructure being planned today will be stranded assets well before the end of it's useful life.

Renewables, storage poised to undercut natural gas prices, increase stranded assets: RMI

If all proposed gas plants are built, 70% of those investments will be rendered uneconomic by 2035, according to the Rocky Mountain Institute.

Carbon-free resources are now cost competitive with new natural gas plants, according to a pair of reports released Monday by the Rocky Mountain Institute.

Wind, solar and storage projects, combined with demand-side management, have reached a "tipping point," one report finds, meaning they're now able to compete alongside natural gas on price while providing the same reliability services. But unlike the fluctuating price of fuels, these technologies' prices are expected to continue dropping, the reports' authors told Utility Dive.

This reality could leave many natural gas investors and utilities with stranded infrastructure assets, the second RMI report finds, and new gas investments should be made with caution.

Even with the additional carbon being released in the Arctic due to warming, the reduction in CO2 and methane from eliminating those two sources of anthropogenic emissions will result in emissions closer to the RCP 2.6 scenario than the RCP 8.5 scenario.

Policy and solutions / Re: But, but, but, China....
« on: November 27, 2019, 07:51:31 PM »
Ken, this is me 30 years ago:

"Renewables will get cheaper and cheaper. The lifetime of a power plant is 40 years. So it can't take any longer for the energy transition. It's a no brainer. Any time now."

Me 20 years ago:

"Wow, if you extrapolate the numbers we are there soon. Amazing!"

Me 10 years ago:

"Holy shit, renewables are almost as cheap as coal. No one can afford to build a coal plant these days."

Me today:

Reads that new coal power plants are still in the planning.

Yes, and peak coal is now on the horizon.  Of those plants in planning, most (if any) won't be built.

As I posted upthread, global coal use is down 3% this year.  While some of that may be weather related (more rain for hydroplants or milder weather cutting energy demand), much of it is due to the fact that outside of China, more coal power plants have been retired than built this year.  And that trend is only going to continue.

Peak coal on the horizon: a country-by-country review
September 2, 2019 by Christine Shearer

Though the global coal fleet still increased by 17GW in the first half of 2019, net of retirements, the pipeline is definitely shrinking. Two thirds of proposed projects never even get started. Notably, in China existing coal plants have been running, on average, only 50% of the time since 2015, evidence of a large excess of capacity. But is it enough? The IPCC’s pathway to 1.5C requires unabated coal power generation to fall by 55-70% by 2030 and be effectively phased out by 2050. That’s why all eyes are on the 15 countries – headed by China (49%), the US (13%) and India (11%) – responsible for 91% of the global coal fleet, generating 2,027GW worldwide, to turn that shrinking pipeline into shrinking capacity. Christine Shearer of Global Energy Monitor dives deep into the latest global stats.

Around the world, 12.7 gigawatts (GW) of new coal capacity has been proposed so far in 2019 – less than 3GW above the amount that has retired (10GW). These trends mean the global coal fleet will soon decline, because only a third of proposed capacity has actually been developed since 2010.

In 2019 to date, about 12.7GW of coal power capacity has been newly proposed across eight countries and 12GW of new construction has started across five countries. These developments are concentrated in China, India, Indonesia, the Philippines and Bangladesh. China also resumed construction on nearly 9GW of capacity that had been postponed under central government restrictions.

Conversely, 132GW of planned new capacity was cancelled in 2019, mainly from lack of activity. The largest numbers of cancellations were in China, India, Myanmar and Turkey.

The implementation rate figure in the table above varies widely, from 0% in Egypt – which has yet to implement any of its projects – to 71% in South Korea. The global average is 35%, meaning just 1GW of new coal has been built or began construction since 2010 for each 3GW of proposed capacity.

India has undergone a large downscaling in its future coal plans, in favour of lower-cost renewables. Turkey has 34GW of coal in the pipeline, but has commissioned only 12% of its proposed capacity since 2010 – a rate that would lead to only 4GW of the 34GW being completed. In reality, the figure may ultimately be even lower than this.

Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan have all reduced their proposed coal capacity, with no new large proposals since 2015. Meanwhile Japan and Korea are also facing public pressure to cut their international financial support for coal, which would leave only China as a significant source of global coal funding – given over 100 financial institutions are restricting coal financing.

Vietnam, Indonesia, Thailand, and Pakistan have all scaled back plans for coal in their future national energy plans, with many of them experiencing significant coal-related financial problems.

It's possible that 2018 was the year that coal consumption peaked.

Policy and solutions / Re: But, but, but, China....
« on: November 26, 2019, 10:33:12 PM »

ps: Ken, how do you rate the chances of reducing CO2 emissions in 2030 by 55% (7.5% p.a.) for +1.5 celsius, 25% for +2 celsius ?

With solar and wind now cheaper than fossil fuels in about three quarters of the world (already cheaper in the developed countries and now at grid parity in China), pretty good.

Given that we're already seeing drops in global coal consumption (down 3% in 2019) and softening of demand for oil and a huge glut in natural gas, the major wildcard is how quickly battery electric vehicles take over the transportation market.  The forecast year for cost parity between BEVs and ICEs is now 2022.  So we should see peak oil demand within the decade.

I doubt we'll see a new coal power plant built after 2025 or a new natural gas power plant after 2035.  Sales of new ICE vehicles will probably be banned in most countries in the 2030s.

I suspect that we wont hit the 7.5% annual decreases needed for the 1.5 degree C target until the 2030s, but we should be able to hit the 2.0 target for emissions reductions in the 2020s and exceed them in the 2030s and 2040s.  With global temperatures increasing at around 0.18 degrees per decade and the five-year average increase around 0.9 C, we'd hit 1.5 degrees in the 2050s. So we'll end up somewhere by 1.5C and 2.0C temperature increase before looking at options for carbon dioxide removal (CDR).

When people think of CDR, they usually think of artificial leaves or other large machines to suck CO2 from the air and pipe it underground (or deep under the sea).  However, there are much better options that can be used to increase global carbon sinks from better agricultural practices, which are increasingly being used.  Look up regenerative agriculture, biochar, sustainable grazing, renewable natural gas, or reductions in methane from rice farming. 

And there are possibilities in kelp farming, with the kelp reducing acidity in the oceans and then being fed to ruminants to reduce their methane emissions.

In the past decade, a lot of progress has been made in all of these areas.  Keep that in mind when you read a gloom and doom report.  We must continue to press our leaders for more rapid changes to reduce greenhouse gases and improve carbon sinks, and we shouldn't give up hope that it can be done.


These were the CMIP 5 models run with the RCP 4.5 emissions scenario.

AbruptSLR likes to selectively quote from Real Climate's recent post on the preliminary CMIP 6 model results.

No one expects consensus climate scientists to stop erring on the side of least drama, ESLD, anytime soon; however, if the preliminary CMIP6 findings are correct then it is likely that several significant tipping points may well have been crossed before consensus climate scientists publicly acknowledge the dangerous situation that we have collectively put ourselves in.

Here is the image from Tamino's post (the runs with the CMIP 5 models using the RCP 4.5 emissions scenario):

Catastrophist bloggers like to post about how the CMIP 6 models run even hotter than the CMIP 5 models and they also like to post a lot of studies using the RCP 8.5 emissions scenario.  As shown upthread, we are no longer projected to burn enough coal to meet the RCP 8.5 scenario.


These were the CMIP 5 models run with the RCP 4.5 emissions scenario.

AbruptSLR likes to selectively quote from Real Climate's recent post on the preliminary CMIP 6 model results.

Here's the part he quotes:

So what should people make of this? Here are some options:
These new higher numbers might be correct. As cloud micro-physical understanding has improved and models better match the real climate, they will converge on a higher ECS.

Here's the part he leaves out:

These new numbers are not correct. There are however many ways in which this might have manifest:
The high ECS models have all included something new and wrong.
They have all neglected a key process that should have been included with the package they did implement.
There has been some overfitting to imperfect observations.
The experimental set-up from which the ECS numbers are calculated is flawed.
There are arguments pro and con for each of these possibilities, and it is premature to decide which of them are relevant. It isn’t even clear that there is one answer that will explain all the high values – it might all be a coincidence – a catalogue of unfortunate choices that give this emergent pattern. We probably won’t find out for a while – though many people are now looking at this.
Why might the numbers be correct? All the preliminary analyses I’ve seen with respect to matches to present day climatologies and variability indicate that the skill scores of the new models (collectively, not just the high ECS ones) are improved over the previous versions. This is discussed in Gettelman et al. (2019) (CESM2), Sellar et al (2019) (UKESM1) etc. Indeed, this is a generic pattern in model development. However, up until now, there has not been any clear relationship between overall skill and climate sensitivity. Whether this will now change is (as yet) unclear.

Why might these numbers be wrong? Well, the independent constraints from the historical changes since the 19th C, or from paleo-climate or from emergent constraints in the CMIP5 models collectively suggest lower numbers (classically 2 to 4.5ºC) and new assessments of these constraints are likely to confirm it. For all these constraints to be wrong, a lot of things have to fall out just right (forcings at the LGM would have to be wrong by a factor of two, asymmetries between cooling and warming might need to be larger than we think, pattern effects need to be very important etc.). That seems unlikely.

There is some indication that for the models with higher ECS that the changes in the abrupt4xCO2 runs are changing so much (more than 10ºC warming) that the models might be exceeding the bounds for which some aspects are valid. Note these are the runs from which the ECS is calculated. What do I mean by this? Take the HadGEM3 model. The Hardiman et al. (2019) paper reports on an artifact in the standard runs related to the rising of the tropopause that ends up putting (fixed) high stratospheric ozone in the troposphere causing an incorrect warming of the tropopause and a massive change of stratospheric water vapor – leading to a positive (and erroneous) amplification of the warming (by about 0.6ºC). Are there other assumptions in these runs that are no longer valid at 10ºC warming? Almost certainly. Is that the explanation? Perhaps not – it turns out that most (though not all) high ECS models also have high transient climate responses (TCR) which happen at much smaller global mean changes (< 3ºC).

Many of the new CMIP 6 models claim that they're addressing cloud micro-physics better but they were developed a few years ago when studies seemed to indicate that clouds have more of cooling effect than they currently are shown to have.  Here's the abstract from the UKESM1 model development paper which states that it shows too much cooling from the 1950s to the 1980s while touting it's new cloud modelling.

We document the development of the first version of the United Kingdom Earth System Model UKESM1. The model represents a major advance on its predecessor HadGEM2‐ES, with enhancements to all component models and new feedback mechanisms. These include: a new core physical model with a well‐resolved stratosphere; terrestrial biogeochemistry with coupled carbon and nitrogen cycles and enhanced land management; tropospheric‐stratospheric chemistry allowing the holistic simulation of radiative forcing from ozone, methane and nitrous oxide; two‐moment, five‐species, modal aerosol; and ocean biogeochemistry with two‐way coupling to the carbon cycle and atmospheric aerosols. The complexity of coupling between the ocean, land and atmosphere physical climate and biogeochemical cycles in UKESM1 is unprecedented for an Earth system model. We describe in detail the process by which the coupled model was developed and tuned to achieve acceptable performance in key physical and Earth system quantities, and discuss the challenges involved in mitigating biases in a model with complex connections between its components. Overall the model performs well, with a stable pre‐industrial state, and good agreement with observations in the latter period of its historical simulations. However, global mean surface temperature exhibits stronger‐than‐observed cooling from 1950 to 1970, followed by rapid warming from 1980 to 2014. Metrics from idealised simulations show a high climate sensitivity relative to previous generations of models: equilibrium climate sensitivity (ECS) is 5.4 K, transient climate response (TCR) ranges from 2.68 K to 2.85 K, and transient climate response to cumulative emissions (TCRE) is 2.49 K/TtC to 2.66 K/TtC.

The details about how they were able to replicate pre-industrial conditions are enlightening:

The physical core of UKESM1 was already well-tuned before adding ESM components (Kuhlbrodt et al., 2018; Williams et al., 2018), and with the exception of the snow-vegetation interaction above it was not deemed necessary to re-tune the physical model parameters. The TOA radiation balance was however altered by the addition of ESM components, through a combination of changes in cloud, surface albedo and radiatively active gases. Without further tuning the net downward radiation at TOA in 1850 was −0.81 W m−2, which would have resulted in a significant downward drift in model temperatures. We brought the TOA radiation into balance by tuning parameters in the Anderson et al. (2001) parametrisation of DMS sea-water concentration to permit lower minimum values of DMS. The standard configuration of this parametrisation has a prescribed minimum value of 2.29 nM for seawater DMS concentration, while gridded observational DMS datasets, such as those of Kettle et al. (1999) or Lana et al. (2011), contain significantly smaller values than this over large regions of the ocean. Anderson et al. (2001) themselves point out that the data from which their parametrisation is derived is likely to contain a sampling bias towards higher values, so a lower minimum is reasonable. We reduced the minimum from 2.29 nM to 1.00 nM, extending the Anderson et al. (2001) linear relationship (between DMS concentration andlog10of chlorophyll concentration, surface SW and nutrient availability) to lower values of DMS. The ensuing reduction in DMS gave widespread decreases in cloud droplet number (and thus cloud albedo) across the Southern Ocean and stratocumulus regions, resulting in a drop in reflected SW at TOA of 2 to 5 Wm−2over large areas of the ocean.

Here's how the CMIP 6 model ECS, TCR and TCRE compare to the CMIP 5 results.  (Note the statement about cloud mcrophysics and cloud aerosol intereactions).

The UKESM1 values of ECS, TCR and TCRE are all higher than those of CMIP5 models (respectively, 2.1 K to 4.7 K, 1.0 K to 2.6 K, and 0.8 K/TtC to 2.4 K/TtC Andrews, Gregory, Webb, & Taylor, 2012; Gillett et al., 2013). Elsewhere in this special issue, Bodas-Salcedo et al. (2019) analyse the increase in atmospheric climate feedbacks in HadGEM3-GC3.1 relative to the previous version of HadGEM3, whose ECS (3.2 K; Senior et al., 2016) is within the range of CMIP5 models. They find that the feedbacks have become more positive as a result of improvements to cloud microphysics and cloud-aerosol interactions.

And they compare their results to observed surface temperatures.

Surface temperature is one of the few variables for which reliable observations cover the full period of the 1850-2014 historical simulation, which allows us to evaluate the model’s first-order climate response to the evolving forcing over this period. The UKESM1 global mean surface temperature anomaly in the historical ensemble shown in Figure 29, along-side the HadCRUT4 observation dataset (Morice, Kennedy, Rayner, & Jones, 2012). The observations represent only a single realisation of the internal variability of the climate system, so one should not expect the model ensemble to be centred on the observations, but rather that the range of observational uncertainty overlaps the ensemble range (under the assumption that the model ensemble is large enough to sample the relevant in-ternal variability). Most ensemble members begin to warm in the early 20th century, then cool strongly between 1950 and 1970 before warming rapidly through to the end of the simulation. The observations show a limited cooling of 0.1 K to 0.2 K during 1940 to 1970, but the model ensemble mean cools by nearly 0.4 K over the same period. All ensemble members also show a stronger cooling response to the large volcanic eruptions of 1883, 1963 and 1991 than is seen in the observations.

Figure 29 also separates the mean surface temperature into northern and south-904ern hemisphere timeseries. The stronger-than-observed cooling is restricted to the north-905ern hemisphere which, together with its temporal evolution, points to either aerosol or906land use forcing as the prime driver. Further investigation into this discrepancy will be907the subject of future work. In the southern hemisphere the model ensemble overlaps with908the observational uncertainty for the entire duration of the experiment, with the excep-909tion of the dip following the Mt. Pinatubo eruption in 1991 noted above.

Policy and solutions / Re: Greta Thunberg's Atlantic crossing
« on: November 16, 2019, 03:12:06 PM »
 Those cultural techniques need to go I'm afraid. It is driven by immoral commerce in stead of rational high morality thinking. Do we want to steer our path into the future or not?  ???

I feel so much for our new humans  :'(, I recognize the deep lifelong damage our current culture does to them. Not just the cultural techniques. Parents in thrall of these techniques and addicted to technofixes will give their toddler a screen, which is a low morality action in my view.
Like other animals young humans need a form of 'natural unbringing' in order for their brainstructure, social systems, non verbal communication skills, emotional action/reaction/understanding, discipline, morality, physical skills, touch/smell capacity etc. to develop to a complete brain and human and without faults (I don't mean natural variation).
And all of this development has to take place in the real world. A world increasingly at a distance for our young ones because the grown-ups pull them in all kinds of abstract versions.

I observe that there is not much critical thinking going on. While there are many good articles on this (as seen in The Guardian).

Policy and solutions / Re: But, but, but, China....
« on: November 15, 2019, 11:44:53 PM »
As per my post in the coal thread, China has a strategic reason to keep its coal-fired generating fleet at relatively low levels of utilization of about 50% - to act as a reserve to replace seaborne natural gas imports and to power greater use of electrical transport (trams, trains, buses, taxis and the couple of a million and increasing number of personal EV's) to replace seaborne oil imports.

This is strategic energy security planning so that they can withstand an energy blockade (as was done with Japan in the months before Pearl Harbour) during any hostilities with the US. By showing that they can, they greatly reduce the possibility of such hostilities. They have also been building up their strategic oil reserve in the past few years and oil and gas imports from Russia and Central Asia through pipelines.

Renewables and nuclear are still at a pretty small amount of Chinese energy use (and capacity), even after the rapid growth of the past few years. So coal will be the bedrock of Chinese energy security. Geopolitics is getting in the way of climate change actions.

If things with the US escalate further, probably after the next Presidential election, I would not be surprised to see China announce a quite radical date for the end of ICE sales in China. EVs move energy supply from oil to electricity (and even with the current Chinese electricity mix reduce lifetime vehicle CO2 emissions). This would also reduce local air pollution a lot (the coal pollution issue having been fixed through very tough particulate matter regulations), especially in the cities, adding to the political legitimacy of the CCP.

So, could be coal use up and CO2 emissions down before 2030 (the Chinese Paris commitment).

Policy and solutions / Re: Coal
« on: November 15, 2019, 11:00:32 PM »
Is coal power winning the US-China trade war?

Actually writing my PhD chapter on China right now, so researching a lot of this stuff. China's greatest worry is a seaborne energy blockade during a conflict with the US, so they are very focused on being able to withstand that.

They keep coal imports at only 6% of consumption, keep a large spare capacity in the coal-fired electricity generating fleet, and are increasing their coal mining capacity (and the efficiency of the coal-fired units). This all gives them the ability to replace all coal imports (increase domestic production) and seaborne natural gas imports (increase the utilization of coal-fired generating plants) if required.

Then their only issue is oil, and they are pushing to increase domestic oil production as well as 20% EV sales share by 2025 (plus most probably all the bus and taxi fleets as well as public transport).Together with removing "frivolous" oil usage, such as vacation air travel and a chunk of petrochemical products, this gives the ability to rapidly reduce oil consumption if required. Russia and Central Asia then become very important as overland friendly suppliers of oil and gas.

The local air pollution issue has been removed through very strict particulate matter regulations (that even the top 100 coal-fired generating units in the US could not meet), so the CCP can focus on the energy security issue given the increasing probability of conflict with the US.

China has signalled that coal power will be a top priority within national energy policy as the government prepares its next Five Year Plan (2021-25).

On 11 October, Premier Li Keqiang chaired a meeting of the National Energy Commission in Beijing that emphasised China’s energy security and coal utilisation and downplayed the importance of a rapid transition away from fossil fuels.

Each meeting of the commission, which was established in 2010 and has met only four times, has had a significant impact on policymaking. Chaired by Premier Li and attended by more than 20 chiefs of China’s ministries and bureaus, the commission is the top body for coordinating energy policy.

The government’s concern over energy security is positive for coal given that China has lots of it. At the meeting, Li Keqiang spoke of speeding up the construction of large-scale coal transportation and electricity transmission infrastructure. He wants to promote “safe and green coal mining”, the “clean and efficient development of coal-fired power”, and to “develop and utilise coalbed methane”. 

Li also downplayed China’s low-carbon energy transition. At the same meeting in 2016, Li called on China to: “increase the proportion of renewables in the energy mix” and “accelerate” such a transition. This year, there was no mention of renewable energy’s share of the energy mix and “acceleration” was replaced by the blander term “development”. The change of tone was hard to miss.

The forum / Re: Forum Decorum
« on: November 15, 2019, 04:48:25 PM »
Thanks Steve.
I don't follow the Tesla thread but my general advise is: JUST BE NICE TO EACH OTHER.

Behave as if it were a real life conversation/discussion. Amongst friends, sharing a forum and interests, being a group of intelligent humans. Respect.

Make compliments. Be creative with it. It's free :).

when there is no other source of greenhouse gas emissions that can make up for the missing coal emissions.
Such certainty gives you away. 30 years of the IPCC and we have not changed the shape of the keeling curve appreciably.
Coal has mostly been swapped for new gas assets with a fifty year life.
I can think of a few potential sources of greenhouse gas emissions including permafrost melt, burning the Amazon and furtive methane from fracking and faulty infrastructure  that could push us over RCP 8.5
RCP 8.5 is very unlikely but not "impossible" at this point.

On the other hand the lower RCP's always have been impossible being based on technology we do not actually have and the application of which we could not achieve in any reasonable expectation of the  economic and political future. 

In fact, studies indicate that if we can keep the temperature rise to 1.5 C the WAIS won't collapse.
@1.2 C now  and  0.2C  a decade that's less than two decades away without allowing for warming masked by human induced aerosols.
1.5C is already blown 2C is highly unlikely and 3C probable on our present path.

You're entitled to your opinion.

However, the science on temperature increases says:

Pathways consistent with 1.5°C of warming above pre-industrial levels can be identified under a range of assumptions about economic growth, technology developments and lifestyles

In model pathways with no or limited overshoot of 1.5°C, global net anthropogenic CO2 emissions decline by about 45% from 2010 levels by 2030 (40–60% interquartile range), reaching net zero around 2050 (2045–2055 interquartile range).1 For limiting global warming to below 2°C with at least 66% probability CO2 emissions are projected to decline by about 25% by 2030 in most pathways (10–30% interquartile range) and reach net zero around 2070 (2065–2080 interquartile range).

As to natural gas infrastructure, I hope you haven't invested in that Ponzi scheme as the wells, pipelines, power plants and associated infrastructure are going to be stranded assets by 2035.

atural Gas Power Stranded Asset Risk Reaches a Tipping Point
By Andrew Burger - Oct 07, 2019

Investment risk in new and proposed natural gas power plants is on the rise. The risk of them becoming stranded assets has reached a tipping point, according to two companion reports produced by the Rocky Mountain Institute (RMI).

Sharp declines in the costs and improving performance of clean energy portfolios (CEPs) that include solar and wind power generation, battery energy storage, energy efficiency and utility-customer demand-side response (DSR) by and large have driven the cost-competitiveness of CEPs below that for new natural gas power plants and electricity across the U.S. That includes investments in the latest, highest efficiency combined-cycle power plants, especially new “peaker” plants designed just to start up quickly and meet sudden, unexpected shortfalls in grid supply or spikes in demand, RMI highlights in The Growing Market for Clean Energy Portfolios and Economic Opportunities for a Shift from New Gas-Fired Generation to Clean Energy Across the United States Electricity Industry.

It will be less expensive to operate new solar and clean energy portfolios than 90% of the proposed combined-cycle natural gas power capacity slated to come online by 2035—some 68 gigawatts’ (GW) worth, according to RMI’s analysis.  And that assumes the pace of clean energy cost declines will slow dramatically and doesn’t consider the impact of prospective climate or renewable energy policies.

On 2, keep in mind that even if MICI is valid the conditions for it according to DeConto and Pollard are:

An increase in ocean temperatures around Antarctica to 2 degrees above current temperatures and extensive hydrofracturing (lots of surface melt that would allow enough melt water to build up that it would penetrate 100 meter plus ice cliffs).  We're nowhere close to seeing those conditions.

In DeConto and Pollard 2016 they instantaneously raised the temperatures (I'm assuming from a 2015 start date) by 2 degrees.  They also used the RCP 8.5 scenario which keeps ramping up the GHG forcings well beyond what is now projected to occur.  The result was that 40 years later the Larsen C ice shelf at the south end of the Antarctic Pennisula collapses.  Thwaites and PIG are closer to the pole than Larsen C so would not collapse until later.  East Antarctica doesn't begin to contribute significantly to sea level rise until the 2100s in their scenario.

So a projection of MICI starting in Antarctica in the 2040s doesn't appear to be supported by science.  In fact, studies indicate that if we can keep the temperature rise to 1.5 C the WAIS won't collapse.

Let's take a look at RCP 8.5.  Basically, all of the IPCC RCPs look very similar until the 2020s and then diverge rapidly in the rest of the 21st century.

So when you read that we are currently closer to RCP 8.5 then we are RCP 4.5 or RCP 2.6, it sounds pretty alarming.  However, we still have 80 years left in this century.

While I imagine that some readers benefit from your posts, it seems to that:

1. Many readers may very well take your posts on anthropogenic radiative forcing scenarios to mean that they have plenty of time left before they need to take effective action; and if this the case then your posts are increasing the likelihood that society will remain on, or close to, a BAU pathway than we would have without your posts, thus moving us away from the left-tail of the first attached image towards the right tail of that conceptual PDF.

2. If some of my observations about ice-climate mechanisms, and MICI-type of failure modes, prove correct then even if society becomes carbon neutral by 2040 a cascade of ice-climate feedback mechanisms could have a major impact on mankind anyway (see the second image)

Edit: The third image from Hansen et al. (2016) shows a representative temporary increase in planetary energy imbalance for a 5-year Doubling time; which is close to my assumed scenario where at least the Byrd Subglacial Basin sustains a MICI-type of collapse circa 2040.  Such a pulse of the planetary energy imbalance could conceptually trigger the ice-climate cascade illustrated by the second image.


1. You misinterpret my posts.  We need to get off of fossil fuels fast. 

What I'm saying is that we're doing that.  My posts are meant to keep hope alive and to correct the misimpressions that many people on this website have that we're too late.  You can see that just upthread of this post someone linked to a very dubious paper (not peer reviewed and not be a climate scientist) saying that we're all doomed and society is going to collapse.

I think that many people read what you post and assume it's true and come away from here thinking that society is doomed.  If we're doomed to collapse, what would be the point of trying to change anything?

Many of your posts take very speculative or extreme projections and imply that they're definitely going to occur.  I think readers of this forum should be told when you point out extreme right tail risks that the conditions for those events occurring haven't yet been met.

Also, you tend to completely ignore facts that make the extreme right tail risks unlikely to occur.  Case in point, renewables have been less expensive than coal for almost two years now.  Investments in new coal plants have plummeted and retirements of coal power plants have accelerated.  Coal use is projected to peak within a few years and then rapidly decrease afterwards.  Even thought that's been pointed out, you seem to think that we'll still be on the RCP 8.5 scenario when there is no other source of greenhouse gas emissions that can make up for the missing coal emissions.

Per the linked article under the recently released IEA's STEPS projection, due to increased: plastic, chemical, SUV, aircraft and natural gas (see image) production; anthropogenic GHG emissions are not likely to plateau before 2040.  If the WAIS collapses before that timeframe, the associated decadal-long increasing in planetary energy imbalance could likely push many Earth Systems past tipping points in the 2040 to 2050 timeframe:

Title: "‘Profound shifts’ underway in energy system, says IEA World Energy Outlook"

Extract: "The world’s CO2 emissions are set to continue rising for decades unless there is greater ambition on climate change, despite the “profound shifts” already underway in the global energy system.

That is one of the key messages from the International Energy Agency’s (IEA) World Energy Outlook 2019, published today. This year’s 810-page edition is notable for its renamed central “Stated Policies Scenario” (STEPS), formerly known as the “New Policies Scenario”.

In this scenario, which aims to mirror the outcome of policies already set out by governments, a surge in wind and solar power would see renewable sources of energy meeting the majority of increases in global energy demand. But a plateau for coal, along with rising demand for oil and gas, would mean global emissions continue to rise throughout the outlook period to 2040.

Oil demand for freight, shipping, aviation and chemicals “continues to grow”, the IEA says, with the growing popularity of SUVs another potential factor propping up demand. (Notably, documentation for the Saudi Aramco share sale also has global oil demand levelling off from around 2035.)"

The EIA and IEA continue to underestimate the growth of renewables (as they have every year for decades).  And they overstate the projected growth of the US fracking production, which is near peak and starved for investment funds because most of the operations lose money.

Is the IEA underestimating renewables?

Scenarios from the International Energy Agency (IEA) have failed to predict the growth of renewables and overestimated the role of nuclear. Critics say that's a political choice.

Last year, the world's photovoltaic power capacity overtook nuclear for the first time – reaching 402 gigawatts, compared to 353 (GW). Wind power outstripped nuclear back in 2014, and by the end of 2017 amounted to 539 GW.

Back in 2010, you might not have predicted such a shift in the global energy mix – at least, not if you were basing your predictions on the International Energy Agency's annual Word Energy Outlook (WEO), which estimated annual deployment of less than 10 GW of photovoltaic capacity.

According to this scenario, globally installed solar capacity would hit around 85 GW last year – 315 GW less than the actual figure.

Critics say this is part of a pattern of the IEA consistently underestimating the growth of renewables while making unrealistic assumptions about the development of nuclear.

IEA Gets Hilariously Slammed For Obsessively Inaccurate Renewable Energy Forecasts

One of our readers recently shared this beauty of a post on Quora. Author Paul Mainwood starts out his short post like this:
I was trawling through the International Energy Agency reports (the way you do) and was struck by two features.
The close similarity of their projections to those put out by the fossil fuel industry (e.g., Shell’s Outlook)
The extraordinary consistency with which they under-forecast the role that renewables will play in energy mix
Like the US Energy Information Administration, the IEA uses various methodologies and assumptions that just consistently bias their forecasts against renewables. It’s easy to assume there are some nefarious ulterior motives underneath these consistent errors — crony capitalism and controlling hand of the pollution industry kind of stuff. That’s certainly possible, but I haven’t seen strong evidence of it and won’t jump to conclusions.

Hard to see which line stands out from the rest, eh?

Looking at the IEA forecasts without the corrected projection, the growth can look positive at first glance … but also depressingly slow. Looking at the corrected projection, we get an adoption trend that is much more in line with the disruptive S-curve many people closely following clean energy have been expecting.

The EIA Is Grossly Overestimating U.S. Shale
By Nick Cunningham - Nov 12, 2019, 6:00 PM CST

The prevailing wisdom that sees explosive and long-term potential for U.S. shale may rest on some faulty and overly-optimistic assumptions, according to a new report.

Forecasts from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), along with those from its Paris-based counterpart, the International Energy Agency (IEA), are often cited as the gold standard for energy outlooks. Businesses and governments often refer to these forecasts for long-term investments and policy planning.

In that context, it is important to know if the figures are accurate, to the extent that anyone can accurately forecast precise figures decades into the future. A new report from the Post Carbon Institute asserts that the EIA’s reference case for production forecasts through 2050 “are extremely optimistic for the most part, and therefore highly unlikely to be realized.”

He notes that in some instances, the EIA’s forecasts are so optimistic that the production volumes exceed the agency’s own estimates for proven reserves plus unproven reserves. The EIA also assumes that every last drop of proven reserves is produced, along with a high percentage of unproven reserves by 2050.

“Although the ‘shale revolution’ has provided a reprieve from what just 15 years ago was thought to be a terminal decline in oil and gas production in the U.S.,” Hughes writes, “this reprieve is temporary, and the U.S. would be well advised to plan for much-reduced shale oil and gas production in the long term.”

I note that DeConto and Pollard (2016) indicated that Totten Glacier (located in the Aurora Subglacial Basin) is susceptible to an MICI-type of ice mass loss this century, and the attached image from the linked reference shows that the Wilkes Subglacial Basin is interconnected with the Aurora Subglacial Basin.  Thus, if Totten Glacier were to sustain an MICI-type of collapse this century, it would likely undermine the ice in the Wilkes Subglacial Basin:


You're mistaken about that.  Here are the projections for RCP 8.5 from DeConto and Pollard 2016:

In RCP8.5, increased precipitation causes an initial, minor gain in total ice mass (Fig. 4d), but rapidly warming summer air temperatures trigger extensive surface meltwater production and hydrofracturing of ice shelves by the middle of this century (Extended Data Fig. 4). The Larsen C is one of the first shelves to be lost, about 2055. Around the same time, major thinning and retreat of outlet glaciers commences in the Amundsen Sea Embayment, beginning with Pine Island Glacier (Fig. 4h), and along the Bellingshausen margin. Massive meltwater production on shelf surfaces, and eventually on the flanks of the ice sheet, would quickly overcome the buffering capacity of firn. In the model, the meltwater accelerates WAIS retreat via its thermomechanical influence on ice rheology (Methods) and the influence of hydrofacturing on crevassing and structural failure of the retreating margin. Antarctica contributes 77 cm of GMSL rise by 2100, and continued loss of the Ross and Weddell Sea ice shelves drives WAIS retreat from three sides simultaneously (the Amundsen, Ross, and Weddell seas), all with reverse-sloping beds into the deep ice-sheet interior. As a result, WAIS collapses within 250 years. At the same time, steady retreat into the Wilkes and Aurora basins, where the ice above floatation is >2,000 m thick, adds substantially to the rate of sea-level rise, exceeding 4 cm yr−1 (Fig. 4c) in the next century, which is comparable to maximum rates of sea-level rise during the last deglaciation. At 2500, GMSL rise for the RCP8.5 scenario is 12.3 m. As in our LIG simulations, atmosphere–ice sheet coupling accounting for the warming feedback associated with the retreating ice sheet adds an additional 1.3 m of GMSL to the RCP8.5 scenario (Fig. 4b).

So in the worst case emissions scenario, which is no longer feasible because we aren't going to burn that much coal, the West Antarctic ice shelves collapse after the Larsen C, which collapses in the 2050s.  The Wilkes and Aurora basins would contribute to sea level rise next century, after 2100.

And Rob DeConto has publicly backed off of these projections.

Two years ago, the glaciologists Robert DeConto and David Pollard rocked their field with a paper arguing that several massive glaciers in Antarctica were much more unstable than previously thought. Those key glaciers—which include Thwaites Glacier and Pine Island Glacier, both in the frigid continent’s west—could increase global sea levels by more than three feet by 2100, the paper warned. Such a rise could destroy the homes of more than 150 million people worldwide.

They are now revisiting those results. In new work, conducted with three other prominent glaciologists, DeConto and Pollard have lowered some of their worst-case projections for the 21st century. Antarctica may only contribute about a foot of sea-level rise by 2100, they now say. This finding, reached after the team improved their own ice model, is much closer to projections made by other glaciologists.

It is a reassuring constraint placed on one of the most alarming scientific hypotheses advanced this decade. The press had described DeConto and Pollard’s original work as an “ice apocalypse” spawned by a “doomsday glacier.” Now their worst-case skyrocketing sea-level scenario seems extremely unlikely, at least within our own lifetimes.

Skeptical Science has a very good overview of MICI.

DeConto and Pollard are also currently revisiting their 2016 results in a new paper. DeConto says he is not able to comment on it directly as it is undergoing peer review. However, he has presented some preliminary results at the Fall Meeting of the American Geophysical Union (AGU) in December.

An article published in the Atlantic shortly afterwards reported that DeConto and Pollard “have lowered some of their worst-case projections for the 21st century” after making improvements to their model. The results are likely to put Antarctica’s contribution to sea level rise in 2100 at “about a foot” (30cm), the article says, which is “much closer to projections made by other glaciologists”.

And new models of ice sheet failure published just last month indicate that when realistic time frames of ice shelf collapse (such as the two weeks it took for Larsen B when the it collapsed) are applied to high ice cliffs, the ice cliffs flow semi-viscously instead of shattering in brittle collapse, which is what the MICI model predicts.

There are also studies that show that past incidents of sea-level rise can be explained without MICI and that water can flow (and does in Antarctica) off of the surface of an ice sheet instead of penetrating down into crevasses to create the hydrofractures necessary for the  initiation of MICI.

So to recap:

- AbruptSLR continues to confuse the timeframes of the original MICI models published in 2016
- The authors of the original MICI models now state that the 2016 projections were too pessimistic
- Other studies have shown that ice flows instead of fails in a brittle manner, which casts doubt on the mechanism needed for MICI to occur.
- Past sea level rise could have occurred without needing the MICI mechanism
- MICI needs hydrofracturing to occur before MICI can occur and yet there are areas in Antarctica where water flows off the ice sheet rather than penetrating through it to create hydrofractures
- Coal is now more expensive than solar and wind power and coal use is expected to peak next decade, so the emission projections of RCP 8.5 from the 2020s through 2100 aren't possible.


ASLR, you have some reference to the statement about increasing winds? On what latitudes would that be?

You appear to have confused 'westerly winds over the Southern Ocean' (also known as westerlies or by South latitude as the roaring forties, furious fifties and screaming sixties, see linked article) with westerly winds in other regions of the Earth.

Title: "Increases in westerly winds weaken the Southern Ocean carbon sink"

Extract: "A new study of lake sediments from the sub-Antarctic reveals for the first time that increases in westerly winds are likely to reduce the ability of the Southern Ocean to absorb carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. The results are significant as the Southern Ocean currently absorbs over 40% of human-produced carbon dioxide, so any weakening of this 'carbon sink' could accelerate climate change. The findings are published today (Monday 23 July 2018) in the journal Nature Geoscience.

The Southern Hemisphere westerly winds (known by latitude as the roaring forties, furious fifties, and screaming sixties) are particularly strong due to the absence of continental landmasses between South America and Antarctica to slow them down."

As for proof that the westerlies (over the Southern Ocean) wind velocity has increased in recent decades, just search the term 'westerlies' in this thread and you will find dozens of peer reviewed references that have documented this fact.

Arctic sea ice / Re: When will the Arctic Go Ice Free?
« on: November 08, 2019, 09:21:04 PM »
If you go and look at old posts in What the buoys are showing, you can find plenty of temperature profile data of how the temperature profiles through the ice change during the season.

There's all sorts of stuff that matters a little, but the big effect that breaks symmetry between freeze and thaw, is as you note, the cold enters from above and leaves in both directions.

In a simple model the temperature profile is linear during freeze (from -1.8 at the bottom to -20 or whatever you pick as the representative freezing season temperature at the top). In the later part of thaw its also linear, (from -1.8 to 0) but although the top increases to zero fairly fast, it takes several months during which there is a gradually decreasing bump in the middle for the whole profile to flatten out.

The big transfer is the latent heat, but when that isn't being conducted through the ice, the profile is set by conducting heat into the ice to heat up the middle from its winter temperature to its late summer temperature.

Policy and solutions / Re: Electric cars
« on: November 05, 2019, 02:52:12 PM »
Personal EVs have no place in a equitable and sustainable world. FUCKING NONE.

Neither do 10 billion people.  So go get a list and tell the *ucking poor bastards who is going to die because it costs too much CO2 to get food to them.

I'll stand behind you as they tear you and all those who think alike, to shreds.

I know you haven't worked it out because you are too blinded by your own viewpoint to see, but the 1st world with its personal transport and money and power and waste are already producing the largest reductions in CO2 emissions in the world.

The growth?

It is coming from those who do not have,today, but are determined to have in the near future.

Go tell them they can't have because you think they should not have it.

I'll be right behind you...

Electric personal vehicles are their "birthright" and who are you, the rich hypocrite (their words not mine), to tell them otherwise?

Policy and solutions / Re: Electric cars
« on: November 05, 2019, 02:31:01 PM »
Support the young, instead of keeping them down, and maybe one day they'll forgive you.

Yeah, well my much younger boss is on a business flight to NY today.  Yesterday he challenged me about something I said. I told him I had already cross checked what I claimed on a CO2 footprint site and asked if his statement was based on the same.

At which point he stopped and said "really?".

You see the problem is that most of the younger people, today, don't check facts. Half of them just go with the flow and follow the sound bytes, the other half reject it utterly.

I don't care if the young ever forgive me,.  After all I'm hardly the Trump in my views. But I will be dead and they can think of me whatever they like.

What I wonder is whether they will ever forgive themselves in the century to come.

What you need to ask yourself is why those who know what is coming, who are young but old enough to vote, don't trust your point of view.

That is what is going to kill this society and the more radical the Greta followers get, the harder attitudes become.

Me? I'll do what I do, mitigate what I can.  Then I'll die and my children, grandchildren and their progeny will live out this tragedy.

The irony?

I suffered the ridicule of the damned in the 90's promoting CO2 mitigation and moderation and government action on climate change.

Now I'm ridiculed by the very group I helped to Foster all those years ago.

Imagine how I feel about it.  But, wait, nobody gives a shit about my view because they have a viewpoint and I'm "entitled" to it.

Welcome to debate in the 21st century.

Policy and solutions / Re: Tesla glory/failure
« on: November 04, 2019, 01:54:47 PM »
The problem is that at low SoC or high DoD, whichever way you want to view it, the battery chemistry starts to weaken making dendrites more likely.

The BMS has two defences against this, temperature and voltage.

The Tesla BMS is brilliantly engineered to deliver the best possible charge.  The problem is that there are three types of dendrites and one of them comes with lowered voltage slower charging.

The BMS can help, but if the owner insists on weakening the chemistry of the cell, there is little more that the BMS can do.

It is not going to be pretty when we have 100m EV on the roads and a significant proportion are suffering owner damaged batteries simply because they didn't know what not to do.

Roll on dry chemistry that does not produce dendrites so easily.

Policy and solutions / Re: Tesla glory/failure
« on: November 03, 2019, 04:52:27 PM »
Ok, i'm really trying to understand what you try to say and i think i have it now.

Are you saying, suppose someone would buy a Tesla, and then set the max-charge limit to say 10%, they then would discharge from 10% to 0% and then charge to 10% again - and they would do that the whole lifetime of the car, in this case, the degradation rate is 10 times higher than usual?

Not quite,

Re: Orens post too.

I am saying that the BMS controls heaat, charge power and other factors which impact the number of cycles.

But the depth of discharge and the level to which the pack is subsequently charged again determines how many times it can charge without damage and there is little any manufacturer or the BMS can do about it.

Diligent owners who charge regularly to a high level and only discharge a small amount between charges will give the very best results. Those who keep the pack on constant drain and constantly use the rapid 15 minute charge will see the very least cycles before the pack starts to degrade.

I am saying and have been saying, that the vast number of a Tesla owners, to date, fall into the former category of minimal discharge and frequent top up.

So the results, compared to Leaf Taxi's is difficult.  First the Leaf BMS is hardly comparable. Second, the Taxi use case is entirely different to normal home users or even fleet users.

Now, factoring everything I have said above, how do you think about marketing x hundred miles for a 30 minute charge from 0 to 50%?

These packs taper the charge over 50%.  Yet if you drop below 60% discharge level, your charge cycles drop off massively.

Leaving you with the choice.  Plan your journey and charge slowly or take the hit on the eventual lifetime of your battery and charge fast from deep discharge.

The smaller the battery, the more cycles you will use.

Until new chemistry arrives (potentially mooted by Tesla), this is the choice we have.

Remember that any survey done today is with some 1% of road users and those users are exemplary early adopters.

Policy and solutions / Re: Tesla glory/failure
« on: November 02, 2019, 12:53:17 PM »
Does nobody ever read the links I post.

Depth of discharge table.

READ it before repeating that you know nothing about Li cycles a battery life.

My father used to run the battery shop for RAF Waddington.  He was, quite literally, responsible for the health of the batteries of all types for hundreds of aircraft.

Almost everything he taught me about batteries does not apply to Li.

DoD chart.  Charge cycles on Li roughly equare to longevity.

Read it and understand.  If you run your Li battery between 60% and 40% continuously, you will start to degrade the battery after 1,500 cycles.

If you run your Li battery down to 80% and recharge to 100% you will start to degrade the battery after 9,000 cycles. Exactly the same energy used, 6 times more cycles.

This is annoying me.  Before telling me I am wrong read the literature.

It is why I keep telling you that the high charge rates of 0% to 50% are a faustian bargain.

It does not matter if Tesla don't let the pack drop below 10% of true power. It does not matter about BMS, BMS just helps with managing heat, charge voltage related issues and cross cell charge states to maximise this situation.

This is about the cell chemistry of each individual cell and how it responds to charging and discharging and how that reduces charge cycles available.

Even if everything else is perfect, the way you discharge and charge your battery determines how long it will last before it degrades.

Depth of

Discharge cycles

Table 2: Cycle life as a function of
depth of discharge.*  A partial discharge reduces stress and prolongs battery life, so does a partial charge. Elevated temperature and high currents also affect cycle life.

Note: 100% DoD is a full cycle; 10% is very brief. Cycling in mid-state-of-charge would have best longevity.
DoD and cycles.

                           NMC    LiPO4
100% DoD   ~300   ~600
80% DoD   ~400   ~900
60% DoD   ~600   ~1,500
40% DoD   ~1,000   ~3,000
20% DoD   ~2,000   ~9,000
10% DoD   ~6,000   ~15,000

If you have an alternate study, please link it, because I have linked 3 of these now in more than one thread and they all say the same thing.  In fact one of them shows that some seriously degraded pouch cells showed the highest surface charge.  It was only descovered when they were sectioned and analysed.

There is also a lot of confusion on this whole website about the RCP scenarios used to make future projections.  The most alarming studies use RCP 8.5 to get their alarming results and they tend to downplay the benefits of limiting emissions to the RCP 2.6 scenario.

People look at emissions today and think they will continue on at the same rate into the future without taking into account recent advancements in renewable energy and battery technology.  (Keep in mind that the bulk of emissions projected for the 21st century occur after 2030.)  Here is a study that explains the assumptions in the RCP 8.5 scenario:

A growing population and economy combined with assumptions about slow improvements of energy efficiency lead in RCP8.5 to a large scale increase of primary energy demand by almost a factor of three over the course of the century (Fig. 5). This demand is primarily met by fossil fuels in RCP 8.5. There are two main reasons for this trend. First, the scenario assumes consistent with its storyline a relatively slow pace for innovation in advanced non-fossil technology, leading for these technologies to modest cost and performance improvements (e.g., learning rates for renewables are below 10% per doubling of capacity; see also Riahi et al. 2007 for further detail). Fossil fuel technologies remain thus economically more attractive in RCP8.5. Secondly, availability of large amounts of unconventional fossil resources extends the use of fossil fuels beyond presently extractable reserves (BP 2010). The cumulative extraction of unconventional fossil resources lies, however, within the upper bounds of theoretically extractable occurrences from the literature (Rogner 1997; BGR 2009; WEC 2007).9

Notice that coal makes up most of the projected energy use in RCP8.5.  In RCP 8.5, coal use is projected to increase significantly in 2030 and continue strong growth until 2100.

In reality, wind and solar power have already become cheaper than coal and coal use is expected to peak by 2030 (and possibly even earlier) as the following article, published in August 2019 explains:

China's coal demand to peak around 2025, global usage to follow: report

BEIJING (Reuters) - China’s coal demand will start to fall in 2025 once consumption at utilities and other industrial sectors reaches its peak, a state-owned think tank said in a new report, easing pressure on Beijing to impose tougher curbs on fossil fuels.

The world’s biggest coal consumer is expected to see total consumption fall 18% from 2018 to 2035, and by 39% from 2018 to 2050, the CNPC Economics and Technology Research Institute, run by the state-owned China National Petroleum Corp (CNPC), forecast in a report on Thursday.

However, the CNPC researchers said they expected the total share of coal to drop to 40.5% by 2035 as renewable, nuclear and natural gas capacity continues to increase rapidly.
“With coal demand in China falling gradually, world coal consumption is forecast to reach a peak within 10 years. Meanwhile, China’s coal demand, currently accounting for half of the world’s total, will decline to around 35% by 2050,” the report said.

Wind and solar continue to fall in cost and are now approaching parity with natural gas.

09.11.19 world changing ideas

It’s now cheaper to build new renewables than it is to build natural gas plants
People could save $29 billion on their electric bills if utilities built new clean energy instead of new natural gas plants.

By Adele Peters  2 minute Read
Clean energy has reached a tipping point: It’s now cheaper to build and use a combination of wind, solar, batteries, and other clean tech in the U.S. than to build most proposed natural gas plants. Utilities want to spend $90 billion to build new gas plants and $30 billion to build new gas pipelines—but if they used renewables instead, consumers could save $29 billion in electricity bills, according to a new report from the nonprofit Rocky Mountain Institute.

The researchers looked at how natural gas plants are used on power grids today and then calculated what would be necessary for clean energy to replace those plants, including batteries to store power when wind and solar aren’t available. It’s already cheaper, in almost all cases, to build and run new clean energy projects than natural gas projects. By the middle of the 2030s, clean energy could drop in cost so much that it will be cheaper to build and run new renewables than to keep existing gas plants running, and gas plants could quickly become stranded assets (the same thing is currently happening with coal plants around the country). More than 90% of recently built plants could be forced into early retirement.

Policy and solutions / Re: Tesla glory/failure
« on: October 29, 2019, 07:18:06 PM »
Neil, not that my cat wasn't smart, but when did you say do they come up with those new smarter cats? ;)

I also don't think he is actually competent enough to 'give up on it'.

Woz made his fame by creating smarter circuit boards.  He was a wizard at reducing chip count.  As I recall the Mac superdrive had about 5 chips on it and was mostly driven by software.  It meant a Mac could read just about any drive simply by modifying the software to move the heads elsewhere.  Whereas a PC was locked to the type of drives it could read because the chips on the drive itself (around 40 or so off the top of my head), determined where the heads went.

That was Woz's forte.

Tesla, on the other hand, is creating an artificial intelligence which it is intending to teach to drive.  Once it has learned to drive, Tesla expects that it will be able to continue learning from the human drivers, additional information it is given and other parameters including its own mistakes.

Hence my analogy. Whilst Woz made smarter mousetraps, Tesla is making a smarter cat.  Woz's mousetrap will catch a mouse that comes into it's jaws in a smarter way.  Tesla's cat will go around the house, find all the mice and eat them.

In short, Woz is not qualified to give up as his field of experience doesn't give him enough information to make that decision.

Also, in a similar way, this is what Waymo is doing, by intensively mapping an area, both visible and radio frequency, then uploading all that information into the software as "parameters" is different from what Tesla is doing.  More smarter mousetrap than smarter cat.

Think of it in a different way.  Waymo requires Lidar to be able to map the known to the actual.  It has to have a fast processor because it is always comparing the known (uploaded data), with the actual positioning data coming in.

Tesla, on the other hand, is giving its own self driving engine the ability to see the road.  To recognise what things are and telling it how to behave when it is driving.  In short Tesla is teaching its software to drive just as you teach a human to drive.

So when Tesla succeeds, as I have no doubt they will, the Tesla FSD computer will "see" more than a human can see, react as a human reacts, only faster and drive like a human that always obeys the laws. 

Every time a Tesla goes somewhere it has never been before it will "learn" the road signs and the way of driving around.  It won't already know the traffic patterns although it will have the same Satnav Data that the humans do.  It will just use it faster and more efficiently.

Get the idea?

Right now a Tesla drives like a 5 year old.  Very slowly and fully supervised by a human.  The difference is that AI can learn at incredible speed.  Can literally Age years in minutes or hours.

Also the difference is that once ONE AI has learned something, they have ALL learned it in exactly the same way. One Tesla knows how to drive in LA, every Tesla knows how to drive in LA.  One Tesla knows how to drive in NY, every Tesla knows how to drive in NY.  Because Tesla's won't be storing maps or data or location information, any more than we do, it will be able to understand the entire country, just as a human would who had driven in the entire country.  Waymo cars can't as they'd require petabytes of data to be carried around in each and every one.

It is useful to understand exactly what Tesla is intending to achieve and just how far they have already gone.

The only question is just exactly when the Tesla FSD software is going to age from 5 to 25 and how many days, or hours, or minutes, it will take when they finally get the data and the software tuned enough.

Food for thought?

Policy and solutions / Re: Renewable Energy
« on: October 23, 2019, 04:51:54 AM »
I use an inverter fridge running on solar . It uses less than 0.8kwh a day .
It only requires around 500 watts of panels and  200 amp hours x 12 v of storage @ 37 south.
You could supply such a set up for less than one thousand usd per household complete.
Sufficient Refrigeration for a family of six as well as running LED lighting .
The more insulation you build into the fridge the less power it needs. Many domestic fridges are to lightly insulated.

The human tendency to constantly expect an apocalypse of one sort of another is a very common delusion. This thread isn't about that. Sark's postings are on-topic but his skills as a communicator seem to be very small. When people express their frustration over the fact that he seems to be trying to say something very important, but totally failing to explain what it is, then they are suddenly trolling a "flow of consciousness" artist?

Please ...

Consequences / Re: Hurricane Season 2019
« on: October 15, 2019, 02:25:28 PM »
For the current thinking on how climate change is affecting cyclones see:

Tropical Cyclones and Climate Change Assessment: Part I. Detection and Attribution

There isn't overwhelming evidence for anything yet, but the sorts of things that look suspicious are listed in the summary.

 "Most authors agreed that the balance of evidence suggests detectable anthropogenic contributions to:
i) the poleward migration of the latitude of maximum intensity in the western North Pacific;
ii) increased occurrence of extremely severe (post-monsoon season) cyclonic storms in the Arabian Sea;
iii)increased global average intensity of the strongest TCs since early 1980s;
iv) increase in global proportion of TCs reaching Category 4 or 5 intensity in recent decades;
and v) increased frequency of Hurricane Harvey-like extreme precipitation events in the Texas (U.S.) region. "

Very nice, and may I add a few more summaries:
i) The opinion on the author team was divided on whether any observed poleward TC changes demonstrate discernible anthropogenic influence.
ii) None of these observed tropical cyclone timeseries demonstrate clear evidence for a century-scale increase similar to that observed for global mean temperature.
iii-a)  U.S. landfalling hurricane counts (1878-2017) show a nominally negative decline, although
        the trend over 1900-2017 is not statistically significant.
iii-b) The timeseries of tropical cylcone landfalls for Japan since 1901 and global tropical cyclone
        and hurricane frequency since 1970 also show no strong evidence for trends.
iii)  In summary, no detectable anthropogenic influence has been identified to date in observed TC
      landfalling data, using Type I error avoidance criteria. From the viewpoint of Type II error
      avoidance, one of the above changes (decrease in severe landfalling TCs in eastern Australia)
      was rated as detectable, though not attributable to anthropogenic forcing.
iv)    A slight increasing trend in global intensity for the strongest TCs (at least hurricane
intensity) was identified (p-value of 0.1).
v)  we conclude that there is only low confidence in detection and attribution of any anthropogenic influence on historical TC intensity in any basin or globally.  However, ten of 11 authors concluded that the balance of evidence suggests that there is a detectable increase in the global average intensity of the strongest (hurricane-strength) tropical clyclones since the early 1980s.
vi)  the evidence for detectable increases in U.S storm total inundation levels, apart from changes expected from sea level rise influence, is mixed.
vii)  In summary, the author team had low confidence that anthropogenic influence specifically on hurricane precipitation rates has been detected. Alternatively, all authors concluded that the balance of evidence suggests that there has been a detectable long-term increase in occurrence of Hurricane Harvey-like extreme precipitation events in the eastern Texas region, and that anthropogenic forcing has contributed to this increase.

Consequences / Re: Hurricane Season 2019
« on: October 14, 2019, 05:56:38 PM »
Did not realize until now that KK is a cartoon figure, which stems back from the '60ies. Through more than 700 posts over the past year, this guy has tried to divert discussions from relevant and meaningful conversation.

I feel ashamed that this ludicrous character ( from my own time zone! ) has been allowed to spoil so many threads over the past year. This thread in particular is about more than 60 dead people in Japan this weekend,  hundreds of victims in the Bahamas during the past month and many more to come.

To rephrase a certain young activist: "How dare you?"

Glad to see that you recognize my character - also from my childhood time zone. 

How dare I?  You are the one diverting this thread from meaningful and relevant conversation.
Your post is typical of those who wish to influence scientific debate by incorporating an emotional element.  Sure, people feel for those who had to suffer through these diasterous events.  However, long term deaths have not increased due to hurricane activity.  Since 1880, the long term trend in Atlantic hurricane deaths is flat, i.e. no change.  On average, 760 hurricane fatalties have occurred annually.  That is the same today as it was 140 years ago, and that is total deaths!  Considering that the population has increased 5-fold since then, that is actually a significant drop in the death rate.  The deadliest years were 1900 (~12,000), 1998 (9,715), and 1930, 1963, and 1974 (~8,000 each).

The national hurricane center has calculated the accumulated cylcone energy (ACE) since 1950.  During that first decade (1950s) there were 69 total hurricanes.  This past decade (2010s), there have been 71.  NOAA has even stated that the trend in Atlantic hurricanes is "not significantly distinguishable from zero."  Sorry if I prefer solid scientific evidence over hyperbole.

Consequences / Re: Hurricane Season 2019
« on: October 14, 2019, 03:39:54 PM »
When we talk ice KkK focuses on area/extent, a lower-dimensional measure than volume that produces a very long term prediction. That way he can avoid the truth that the volume numbers reveal.

When we talk Hurricanes KkK focuses like a laser, on ACE, which only includes wind speed and duration. He must ignore the floods, the rapid intensification, the slower paths, and the increased destructiveness.

He must pretend that average = normal AND that ACE is the only average that matters. Lucky him for being able to do that. I guess I'm just jealous of his bliss.

Sometimes it is important to focus on the most relevant numbers, rather than those which best exemplify ones own viewpoint.

Policy and solutions / Re: Renewable Energy
« on: October 08, 2019, 07:58:16 PM »
With all of the bad news at the Federal Government level, it's easy to overlook the progress that is being made in the transition to a carbon free economy.  With renewables being cheaper than fossil fuels, "green-washing" has given way to lowering costs by going green.

At a time when the federal government is increasingly stepping away from addressing issues like sustainability and climate change, corporate America is stepping up. Retail giants from Target to Walmart to Amazon; and tech titans from Apple to Google to Facebook, are taking action to respond because it’s good for business and good for corporate image. For many consumers, addressing core issues like climate change and sustainability go hand-in-hand with attracting their business.

Going green has never looked so good — or cost so little. Solar power is almost 90 percent cheaper than it was 10 years ago and wind power is about 70 percent cheaper, said Gregory Wetstone, president and chief executive of the American Council on Renewable Energy, a nonprofit that promotes the transition to renewable power. That explains why companies in the United States purchased three times as much power generated from solar and wind energy in 2018 than they did the year before.

“Every aspect of retailing’s machine is going to be modernized and ultimately energized green,” said Marshal Cohen, chief retail industry analyst at The NPD Group, a research and consulting specialist. This green evolution not only applies to energy use, but everything from packaging to fuel consumption during delivery, he said. “Retailers will chase greenness to be viewed as part of their DNA.”

This has left many of the world’s biggest companies falling all over themselves to embrace solar power, wind power and other renewables. But over the past decade, major retailers like Target and Walmart, who use vast quantities of energy in their stores, have gone from sticking a toe in the water to diving in headfirst.

I think that many of the posters on this site who embrace a negative outlook on the growth of renewables are under-estimating the pace of the transition.  They think that the current deployment rates, which involve decisions made when renewables cost more than fossil fuel energy, can be used to forecast the future.

But new investments being made now will have to take into account that it's cheaper to build new renewable power plants (or slap a bunch of solar panels on a roof) than it is to buy power from an operating fossil fuel plant.  That means that the only limit on how fast fossil fuels will be phased out is how quickly new wind and solar plants can be built.

That's not hopium, that's economics.

Consequences / Re: Hurricane Season 2019
« on: September 23, 2019, 07:25:13 PM »
At the autumnal equinox, this is where the global tropical season stands based on accumulated cylcone energy (ACE):

North Atlantic:  82.0, an increase of 11.9% above the average ACE of 73.3
Northeast Pacific:  92.1, a decrease of 10.4% from the average of 102.8
Northwest Pacific:  113.4, a decrease of 36.2% from the average of 177.8
North Indian:  34.6, an increase of 317% above the average of 8.3

Northern Hemisphere:  322.1, a decrease of 11% from the average of 362.2

Science / Re: Magnitude of future warming
« on: September 22, 2019, 08:32:59 PM »
Some fractino of carbon dioxide will remain in the atmosphere for centuries, perhaps millenia.

However, the atmospheric concentration is a function of both the amount present and the amount emitted.  Should emissions cease tomorrow (bear with me for a bit), atmospheric concentrations would begin to decline, rapidly at first, until they reach about ~25% of emitted levels.  This approximate value is consistent among all three previous references.  That equates to about 314 ppm after a century (280 ppm + 25% * (415 ppm - 280 ppm).  Hence, global temperatures would begin to fall shortly after atmospheric CO2 levels begin falling.

Obviously, emissions will not cease tomorrow.  They do not need to, in order to stabilize atmospheric concentrations at current conditions.  While the last 25% of emissions takes centuries to be removed, the first 25% is fast, taking about one decade.  Estimates vary widely, but an emissions reduction of about 40% would stabilize concentrations at current levels.
I thought some arithmetic was in order, starting with

While the last 25% of emissions takes centuries to be removed, the first 25% is fast, taking about one decade.

415 ppm = a bit above 3,200 GT of atmospheric CO2.
280 ppm = a bit below 2,200 GT of atmospheric CO2.

Addition by us = circa 1,050 GT
25% of that     = 260 GT (1st decade loss)
which equates to 26 GT per annum

Current sequestration by the sinks is estimated at 55% of emissions at round 36GT = 20 GT per annum

(If that 1st decade applied to the total CO2 in the atmosphere,
we are talking about over 80 GT per annum sequestration required)
Estimates vary widely, but an emissions reduction of about 40% would stabilize concentrations at current levels.

I made a little spreadsheet, assuming a quick reduction in emissions of 40% by 2030. The answer is IFF (if and only if) total sequestration stayed at (or above) current levels in GT, by 2030 CO2 ppm would start to fall, i.e. Klondike Kat's statement shown to be correct

BUT this defies history. Since the Keeling curve started, the data shows net addition to atmospheric CO2 at just below half of CO2 emissions. All the science says that the oceans are circa 30%, the land-based sinks circa 25% of that total sequestration of circa 55% of emissions.

The table shows that as emissions rose, sequestration by the sinks rose.
Data in GT        Emissions   Sequestration by the Sinks
1970s             17.14              9.60
1980s             20.01            12.60
2010’s             35.34            18.02

Qu:- If emissions fall, why should sequestration by the sinks stay up?

If sequestration as emissions fall mirrors sequestration as emissions increase, all that happens is that ppm increases slow.

I admit to being confused with little confidence in the attached graphs.

Arctic sea ice / Re: The 2019 melting season
« on: September 17, 2019, 12:07:04 AM »
It is interesting to note that there is a pattern to the very bad years of 2007, 2012, 2016, and 2019.

The first "bad" year was 2007. It took five years for 2012 to happen. It took four years for 2016 to happen. It took three years for 2019 to happen.

Perhaps it is nonsense, but that would put 4M KM^2 minimum as "normal" come 2021 (two years after 2019, and then we are down to one year separating these instances, i.e. it becomes each and every year), with each year thereafter likely to achieve a max under 2019, 2016, and 2007.

It should also be noted the last minimum above 5M KM^2 looks to be 2009. That is potentially about 11 years between the last minimum above 5M KM^2 and the last minimum above 4M KM^2 (using the step-trend above, that year would be 2020, or it may have already occurred).

We cannot say whether the remaining decline will follow on the same gradual continuum. Below 4M KM^2, the area / volume discrepancy inherently favors massive drops in area relative to volume as 0 is approached. I would think that there will not be another 11 years between the last 4M KM^2 min and the last 3M KM^2 min.

Does that mean we are approaching an asymptote at 4 M?

The rest / Re: Astronomical news
« on: September 11, 2019, 11:46:15 PM »
First Water Detected on Potentially 'Habitable' Planet

This is still interesting don't get me wrong, but this kind of info belongs to any mention of so called "earth-like" exoplanets.

IMO this kind of exoplanet is not even worth to mention in the context of finding "Earth II" or habitability. It's clearly NOT habitable because it's obvious for several reasons that it is not suitable for the kind of life we're ultimately looking for and habitable means "FOR US HUMANS" and not for germs and bacteria etc.

It takes way more than the right temps and then gravitation eight times earth level would crush all things we know are necessary for intelligent and/or human life.

A planet so close to it's sun cannot even considered inside the habitable zone, despite perhaps the right temps.

Further planets that are to close to their sun usually stopped rotating long ago and therefore would have very small band of "right" temps while the rest would be burning or freezing and in the process produce extremely strong winds, way beyond what we consider strong on planet earth.

And what you said, radiation without being protected due to lack of magnetic field due to lack of rotation etc. etc.
Agree to your comment (well 8 times earth mass does not imply 8g at surface).
But I think water is important.
Problem with Mars, water is not there in quantities, so why don’t we colonize Sahara? As hard but no need of space travel...
If we cannot even fill Sahara with massive viable solar energy plants...
Billionaire dreams ... space travel.

Consequences / Re: Wildfires
« on: September 07, 2019, 06:35:20 AM »
I am sorry if I don’t go deep enough or I have wandered somewhat. I am not a researcher and I don’t have a degree.

What I found (research listed below)

The first three articles support the idea that primary forests have indeed been reduced in area. Although complex, the global area is reducing for old growth forests.

Reforested land or plantations do make up for it somewhat but ultimately the amount of land that is forested has decline over the last 300 odd years. Not a massive surprise.

It does appear that the temperate regions (Russia) remains about the same although it is stressed. Tropical regions are not doing as well (

I then saw something about soil and carbon, so I looked into that to see if there was a difference between how much carbon was held in old growth forests compared to plantation forests. From what I can determine at this quick glance, is old growth forests store a lot of carbon and the soil goes deeper. Reforested or plantations also store a lot of carbon in the soil but the depth of the soil is less and the root systems are not as deep as old growth forests. BUT, plantation forest are a positive influence in taking carbon out of the air and into the soil and is one way to improve soil quality over time. (my thinking is it would be better to simply not destroy old growth forest in the first place)

Burning old growth forests does release more carbon via burning and then soil degradation after the fact, something that is happening in Central Africa, SE Asia and the Amazon. Australia as well, but I don’t think that is deliberate, that is just climate changing in a way that allows more and bigger fires to occur naturally.

This is getting way off track, if I dig any deeper I will find myself down a bottomless pit of reading.
In short, old growth forests are reducing over the last 300 years. Reforestation is sort of keeping up but is losing the battle, and the quality of forest (diversity of life, soil quality etc) is reduced.
I am so sorry for dragging the wildfire thread off topic. The only thing I got from this is that old forest destruction via burning is far worse than other types of forests mostly because of the degradation of soil and reduced diversity of life.

Article One
Here, we provide the first global gridded estimates of the underlying land conversions (land‐use transitions), wood harvesting, and resulting secondary lands annually, for the period 1700–2000. Using data‐based historical cases, our results suggest that 42–68% of the land surface was impacted by land‐use activities (crop, pasture, wood harvest) during this period, some multiple times. Secondary land area increased 10–44 × 106 km2; about half of this was forested. Wood harvest and shifting cultivation generated 70–90% of the secondary land by 2000

Article 2
The results of a new approach to the specification of the relationship between deforestation and population are presented. They suggest that approximately half of the deforestation that has occurred over the long sweep of human history can be explained statistically in terms of population growth. It is cautioned, however, that serious conceptual and methodological problems confront the analysis of the relationship.;2-M

Article three
Forests in Flux
Forests worldwide are in a state of flux, with accelerating losses in some regions and gains in others. Hansen et al. (p. 850) examined global Landsat data at a 30-meter spatial resolution to characterize forest extent, loss, and gain from 2000 to 2012. Globally, 2.3 million square kilometers of forest were lost during the 12-year study period and 0.8 million square kilometers of new forest were gained. The tropics exhibited both the greatest losses and the greatest gains (through regrowth and plantation), with losses outstripping gains.

Article 1
Old-growth forests remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere1,2 at rates that vary with climate and nitrogen deposition3. The sequestered carbon dioxide is stored in live woody tissues and slowly decomposing organic matter in litter and soil4. Old-growth forests therefore serve as a global carbon dioxide sink, but they are not protected by international treaties, because it is generally thought that ageing forests cease to accumulate carbon5,6. Here we report a search of literature and databases for forest carbon-flux estimates. We find that in forests between 15 and 800 years of age, net ecosystem productivity (the net carbon balance of the forest including soils) is usually positive. Our results demonstrate that old-growth forests can continue to accumulate carbon, contrary to the long-standing view that they are carbon neutral. Over 30 per cent of the global forest area is unmanaged primary forest, and this area contains the remaining old-growth forests7. Half of the primary forests (6 × 108 hectares) are located in the boreal and temperate regions of the Northern Hemisphere. On the basis of our analysis, these forests alone sequester about 1.3 ± 0.5 gigatonnes of carbon per year. Thus, our findings suggest that 15 per cent of the global forest area, which is currently not considered when offsetting increasing atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations, provides at least 10 per cent of the global net ecosystem productivity8. Old-growth forests accumulate carbon for centuries and contain large quantities of it. We expect, however, that much of this carbon, even soil carbon9, will move back to the atmosphere if these forests are disturbed.

Soil article 2
Mean annual temperature (MAT) was the most important predictor of soil C. Forest age explained little to no variability in soil C, in contrast with above‐ground studies. Data on long‐term trends in soil C are limited, as median time since forest growth was 15 years. Soil C stocks were similar between tropical secondary forests, tree plantations and reference forests. Differences between plantation and successional forests only appeared below 10 cm on sites with MAT < 21.3 °C. Former pastures and cultivated sites differed from each other only to depths of 30 or 100 cm. Climatic variables appeared multiple times across all layers of the regression trees, consistent with strong interactions between MAT and precipitation on soil C stocks.

Arctic sea ice / Re: When will the Arctic Go Ice Free?
« on: September 06, 2019, 07:15:17 AM »

It does not show any flattening (strike effect). And neither does the volume chart.

EDIT: These charts do not show flattening any more than charts showing annual temperatures showed any "hiatus" in the 2000's. Lots and lots of denialists kept claiming that global warming had stopped, and they thought they could see it in the charts, just as you claim that you see a flattening in your charts.

But there was no hiatus in global warming, just natural random variability combined with an outlier (1998). And the same is happening with the SI graphs - natural random variability combined with an outlier (2012)

I am not sure but think the temperature trend did not reach statistically significant levels if you accounted for cherry picking 2012 as the start point. Tamino is saying slowing rate of arctic sea ice loss is statistically significant. At what point do you start to believe and how fully should you believe?

We are talking about two different things here. SharedHumanity is claiming that extent flatlined. Tamino shows that extent loss has decelerated. A decelerated extent loss is still an ongoing extent loss, and cannot be counted as flatlining.

Rather than the 95% which you don't seem to believe, maybe you want 99% significance or 99.5% or 99.9%? Where to draw the line?

I don't really believe in anything, let alone statistics! What a strange question. But I'm 100% certain that a value with a 95% threshold has a 95% change of being correct.

In reality, when something odd/unexpected/different shows up, it could be entirely a new trend or it could be entirely noise and no change in trend, but the likeliest scenario is it is a bit of noise and a bit of trend change.

Perhaps. Has anybody done any research to validate the claim that if somebody thinks they see a pattern in a graph, then the most likely explanation is that there is a pattern, and not just random variability?

7 times faster rate suddenly disappearing is, according to my subjective priors not very likely at all, til we see the data. It is now a possibility but a more likely possibility is the trend rate didn't change by as much as Tamino's piecewise linear trend lines show, instead it is likely a bit of noise and some decline in the rate but not as much as 7 times and to fit it would need to be that rate for more than 4 years.

All noise is possible, but a bit of noise and a bit of trend change is more likely.

Where did that 7 times faster rate come from? And of course, it can have any likelyhood it wants, but once the data is in it's either true or false.

The rest / Re: Are you hoping for a global civilisational collapse?
« on: August 28, 2019, 12:13:09 AM »
I can't imagine that you'd approve of Sagan's dream of an ever expanding Human Race with planet after planet falling victim to our rapacious needs. It's identical to the Capitalist Manifesto demanding growth or death.
The very system that you've railed against for so long. :-\

If we can't satisfy our needs and wants here where we evolved, what makes you believe that we'd do better elsewhere?

Well, we won't make it to other places if we don't get our shit together, to keep paraphrasing. Maybe if humankind would get its shit together, it wouldn't go on a rampage through the galaxy and beyond?

But other that that, I agree with you. If we don't get our shit together, but still manage to colonise Mars somehow, we'd get a Terra-Mars war within a millenium. It would all start when the president of Terra wouldn't appeal to a certain group. They would insist that he is a Mars-churian candidate and that those horrible Martians hacked Terra systems, even the ones under everyone's bed. They'd call the whole thing Marsgate.

The Marsupian Supreme Ruler - Der Elon, as per Von Braun's pioneering work, might respond with V3 Starhoppers, silently flooding Terran airwaves with satellite beamed images of Marauding Martians, Goose Stepping into our FatherLand from their Mother(goose?)Land.

While Wherner never indicated whether an outstretched, downturned right hand would be the proper form when addressing Der Elon. It's reasonable to assume that this would be so.
Are Marsupians our interplanetary future?
Will we be able to Trump this coming Alien Invasion?
Stay tuned for the next Adventures of Der Musk et Man.T.M. ;D

Policy and solutions / Re: Tesla glory/failure
« on: August 25, 2019, 08:25:18 PM »
This is where we know we have entered the fact free zone. 

I fell off the cliff as soon as there was something somehow logical.

But yes, that one crowned the absurdity.

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